My participation in the Paul Klebnikov Fund’s event “What is Russia Thinking? The Word from the Last of the Independent Media” was a great honor. Paul’s widow Musa Klebnikov and his brothers Peter and Michael were amazingly gracious and thankful for my participation. The pleasure however was truly all mine.  They’ve built a vary warm, lively, sophisticated and touching community around Paul’s memory. Being a part of it was certainly an emotional and intellectual experience. For those who’ve never read Paul Klebnikov’s work, I highly recommend it.

What of the event itself?  I would say that well over 100 people were in attendance.  Being in a crowd of such politically well connected people was intimidating at first.  I still consider myself a lowly graduate student who lacks the proper credentials to mix with such a crowd.  But thankfully people were incredibly nice and any nervousness I had wasn’t anything that a few glasses of wine couldn’t smooth out.  Most attendees seemed to have some connection to Paul, whether they were friends and neighbors, colleagues, or admirers of his work.  At the same time, many people who I talked to had a deep interest in Russia, and particular America’s relationship to it. What was perhaps most encouraging was that many appeared frustrated with the typical thinking about Russia, and my sense was that there was a real craving for a more nuanced discourse.  Hopefully, Mikhail Fishman, Sarah Medelson, Andrew Meier and I provided that.

The forum was a dialogue that lasted around an hour and followed by a half and hour of questions.  As often the case in forums like this, not to mention topics as complicated as Russia, time proved to be our greatest enemy.  Not only was there not enough time to cover everything, there was barely enough time to adequately address the questions Andrew Meier posed to us.  Topics ranged from what advice we would give Barack Obama in formulating a Russia policy, the workings of Kremlin politics, the state of Russian journalism and English language journalism on Russia, the Georgian War, the effects of the economic crisis, and the state and future of Russian-American relations.  I won’t recount the details of the discussion. I doubt my memory would do it justice.  I’m told that the event was recorded and I will provide information about how to get access to that when I find out.

The star of the event was Mikhail Fishman, this year’s recipient of the Paul Klebnikov Prize for Excellence in Journalism. By all accounts, Fishman is one of the “rising stars” of Russian journalism.  Fishman covers Russian politics for Russian Newsweek, though he wonders how much time he will have to do this since he was just recently promoted to the magazine’s chief editorship. If Fishman’s comments at the forum were any indication, his stewardship of Russian Newsweek will certainly be something to follow.

What was the final answer to the event’s title/question: What is Russia thinking? Well to paraphrase how Andrew Meier ended the evening: We don’t fully know what Russia is thinking, but we know what the three participants think about Russia.  Very true.  Speaking for myself, I would never presume I could speak for Russia or Russians.  My only hope is that through this blog and participating in events like Monday’s, I can at least attempt to be a fair mediator for Russians to speak and think for themselves.

President Bush sent a gushing statement to Georgia on the fifth anniversary of the “Rose Revolution.”  Bush said in White House press release,

One of the most inspiring chapters in the history of freedom was written by the Georgian people during the Rose Revolution. Thirsting for liberty and armed only with roses in hand, citizens throughout Georgia peacefully staked claim to their God-given right of liberty. These demonstrations proved once again, that when given a choice, people choose to live in freedom.

On this anniversary, Americans honor the brave Georgian citizens who defended freedom, and we renew our commitment to supporting Georgia’s democracy, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. We also look forward to the day when the light of liberty shines on all people throughout the world.

Blech. Under normal circumstances, one could, in fact, one should ignore Bush’s blathering.  His days are numbered, he’s the lamest of all lame ducks, and frankly even he’s looking like January 20 can’t come fast enough.  But these aren’t normal circumstances.  Especially since along with an anniversary greeting came $250 million, the first installment of the $1 billion the US promised to send Georgia as compensation for Saakashvilli’s little war.

The money is to prop up Georgia’s budget as follows:

The USD 250 million grant will fund Georgia’s budget expenditures to cover state pensions, state compensation and state academic stipends – USD 163.3 million; health care costs for people living below the poverty line – USD 26.1 million; allowances to individuals displaced by the conflict in Abkhazia USD 6.1 million; financial support to schools through a voucher system on a per-student basis USD 24.2 million; USD 30.3 million will be allocated for compensation and salaries for government employees of all ministries excluding the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, according to the U.S. embassy.

I love how the Bush Administration snuck school vouchers into the aid.  They’ve been trying to shove this code phrase for privatizing public schools down Americans’ throats to no avail.  One sure way to force a privatization experiment ship it to a foreign country all nice and wrapped up with aid money.

Now granted, in the big scheme of things, $250 million is chump change to the US coffers. It pisses away $1 billion in Iraq in three days.  But considering the recent uproar over holding US automakers responsible for putting themselves on the brink of bankruptcy, shouldn’t there at least be some commotion over sending money to bail out a country that got itself in a mess? Guess not.  Apparently claiming your “God-given right of liberty” comes with a few perks and a lot more dollars.

When Kommersant reported a few days ago that the Russian Orthodox Church was planning on creating Orthodox militias to patrol Russia’s streets, the story was immediately seized by the Russian media, including this blog.

Now according to RIA Novosti, the Church has denied such claims.  “The church is not setting up a private army and would never attempt to do so. It is nonsense. The Russian armed forces already consist of 80% Orthodox believers,” said Dmitry Smirnov, the head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s military relations department. He also rejected Kommersant’s claims that the Church had any discussions with the MVD on the subject.

Smirinov did add that if there are such militias they are of local initiative only.  “It could be a private public initiative put forward by local parishes. If they want to patrol the streets - let them do it. If they want to sweep the streets - even better.”  This seems to be the case in this instance.

Local manifestations of “people’s militias” aren’t unprecedented. One such militia called the “Veterans of North” appeared in Novovinsk, Arkhangelsk province this past summer. The group, which numbered in the tens, engaged in a variety actions from cleaning cemeteries and playgrounds of garbage to making citizens’ arrests.  This year alone, the group was responsible for the arrest of ten people suspected of criminal activity, about a hundred local administrators for violation of the law, seventeen people for traffic violations, and around sixty people in connection of domestic disputes.  The group also functions as security during Church holidays and celebrations. The Veterans however aren’t the first church inspired militia. A similar one was created in Krasnsoyarsk in 2006.

So yes, the Church might not be creating them from the center.  But they are forming in localities.  This isn’t surprising.  If the Soviet period in any indication, experimentation with volunteer groups always began locally, and if they showed promise were adopted by central authorities (even to the point where the authorities took credit for them).  Often establishing central control was done to focus and subordinate local group activity to central concerns, or to get control over locals who took their initiative too far.  One might suspect that something similar is potentially at work here.

Another thing must also be said about these “church militias” and other social forms like them.  The Russian public is often portrayed as politically passive and that Russian civil society is weak.  But if such militias are forming locally and are targeting crime and corruption, perhaps we should rethink how we talk about Russian civil society.  As the local church militias show, there is a Russian civil society.  It just isn’t the “civil society” (i.e. liberal, inclusive, cosmopolitan, tolerant, etc.) that many liberals desire.

Here’s a new one.  The Moscow Patriarch announced that it plans to create an “Orthodox People’s Militia” under the auspices of the Russian Orthodox Church. The militia, according to Father Vsevolod Chaplin, will be

Small groups which will literally dominate the street life of districts, small cities, and villages.  And here, I think the Orthodox militia can maintain order in their hometowns.  Now there exists military-patriotic groups who are physically fit under many church communes and parishes.  They could show a good amount of civil activity.

The groups, which seem to already have been created, will make their official debut on 1 December.  And what will be their most immediate task?  According to Father Kirill Frolov, the leader of the Moscow division of the Union of Orthodox Citizens, the militias will “in some degree be dictated by the possible outcomes of the financial crisis, in particular unemployment.  The militiamen will uphold civil peace and prevent the manifestation of extremism.” The Moscow MVD has already expressed interest in the project.

It’s no coincidence that the announcement of an Orthodox militia also coincides with planned Dissenters’ March on 14 December. One assumes that when the good Father speaks of extremism, he means Other Russia. The Dissenters’ March falls on the anniversary of the Decembrist Uprising of 1825. We all know what happened then: the uprising of hopeful nobles was crushed, ushering in the reign of Nicholas I.  Nicholas is said to have conducted some of the interrogations personally and a compilation of the usurpers’ testimony is said to have sat on his desk as a reminder.  Given the emphasis Nicholas put on Othodoxy as a emblem of Russian nationalism, the potential participation of Orthodox militas as a foil to Other Russia’s plans strikes of a certain historical irony.

What is perhaps less ironic is the fact that the militias are supported by Nashi. Nashi is no stranger to organizing street militias to aid the cops.  Readers will remember that Nashi created the Voluntary Youth Militia before the 2007 parlimentary elections to combat disruptions by “extremist organizations.” Now it seems this experience will be taste tested with an added Orthodox flavor.

Indeed, Nashi has been cozying up to the Orthodox Church as of late. Orthodoxy is being more and more incorporated into Nashi’s ideology and identity.  Last week, during a meeting with Nashi members, Metropolitan Kirill said that there is a need for an all-Russia youth organization based on “traditional values.” “We used to have a youth organization (i.e. the Komsomol) working all through the country. It did a lot of useful work and many of those who belong to political elite today stepped out of the organization, where they gained administrative experience.”  How times have changed.

Nashi is beginning to sound like a perfect template for such an organization.  For example, Boris Yakemenko, one of Nashi’s chief ideologists and brother to the movement’s founder Vasili Yakemenko, recently penned a chapter for a textbook on Orthodox culture entitled “Russian Rock and Orthodoxy.” This year Nashi formed an Orthodox cabinet within its organization. According to Yakemenko, this cabinet was created to “attract youth to the church, speak in a language understandable to young people that says that Orthodoxy is not the religion of old people or “losers” (luzery) but a faith for plenty of successful people who love their country, their culture, and their language.  That is to say, our Orthodox direction will defend the Church and its culture.”

Now they will also defend Russia streets.  And if an article in today’s Vedomosti (Thanks Lyndon!) on the percentage of Russian companies planning cost cutting measures is correct, those Orthodox militias better get on the streets quick.  About 30 percent of Russian companies are planning some kind of trimming of labor according to a survey of 371 companies by Ankor. In the words of Ankor representative Natalia Danina,

The financial crisis has forced practically all companies to cut costs in a variety of ways, including the cutting of personnel.  Besides dismissal as a measure for cutting costs, they plan on cutting the work day and unpaid vacations for employees, and even cutting pay and lowering financial compensation packages.

The more people not working means potentially more people angry and on the streets.  God’s army better get to work.

Oil drops below $50 a barrel.  The global auto industry slashes jobs in France, Thailand, Japan, and the United States. The world’s investors look for a safe haven to run to but none is to be found. Perhaps it’s time to stop referring to the current economic situation as a “financial crisis” and call it a general economic crisis?  For those still wondering what the hell has happened, I suggest reading Niall Ferguson’s cogent explanation of how “Planet Finance” imploded in his “Wall Street Lays Another Egg.”

And what of Russia?  It was only a few weeks that we were told that the crisis was sparing Russia’s “average Joe.” After all, few average Russians have invested in the stock market so the losses were concentrated at the top.  Very true.  But I’m sure Russia’s oligarchs can withstand having a few billion shaved off their paper stacks.  However, for the average Russian, or even the average global citizen, the journey to an economic nadir is not so far.

In fact, there are some indications that Russia’s “average Joes” are no longer as safe as they were assumed to be.  Yesterday, I already mentioned how many Russians are panicking and removing their savings from banks.  Economic pessimism is in the air.  A recent poll by VTsIOM shows that 2/3 (69 percent) of Russians have pessimistic view toward the future of the global economy.  Russians see the main evidence for the crisis as: high inflation (23 percent), the decrease in the population’s standard of living (22 percent, a seven fold growth from September when only 3 percent of respondents gave this answer), and unemployment (10 percent, up from 2 percent).

There are other indicators of how the crisis is impacting the average Russian.  According to one prognosis, the cost of medication rose by 30 percent this year and is expected to rise another 27 percent in the next.

The other day, the Russian government announced it would raise the minimum employment benefits to 850 rubles ($31.05) from 781 and the maximum to 3,400 rubles, up from 3,124 rubles, beginning next year.  The average monthly wage is 17,847 rubles.  The government expects that next year about 350,000 people will lose their jobs.

The Ministry of Education announced that it will not reduce credit to university students struggling to pay student loans. The aim is to prevent students dropping out of school if they can’t meet education costs. A good way to stave off unemployment is to keep people in school.

Even Putin set out to calm the public in his speech at United Russia’s Congress.  He announced plans to give mortgage relief, tax incentives, maintain and increase pensions, promised to prop up the ruble, and ensured the safety of Russia’s banks.

And just to symbolize how touchy things are politically in the provinces, Pavel Verstov, a journalist and member of United Russia, was expelled from the party as an “instigator of instability” and “for activities inconsistent with the interests of the party.” Verstov’s violation of party ethics was an article he wrote for Verstov.info (which appears to be shut down) reporting that there has been four cases of suicide at the  Magnitogorsk Metalworks (MMK) as a result of the economic crisis.  Kommersant reports that Verstov wrote the following:

This is the fourth case of suicide at OAO MMK and its sister companies during the crisis.  People could not endure the credit burden as their pay constantly shrank. The metallurgists chose the noose out of fear that they and their family would be thrown out onto the street for defaulting on their mortgage payments.  A few others, who are less scrupulous laborers at MMK, preferred robbery and armed raids to suicide.  Now they agree to participate in [robberies] even more.

Officials from MMK are calling for some blood of their own.  Namely, Verstov’s.  MMK has sent a request to the local courts demanding that criminal charges be filled against the journalist for publishing “lies.”

So perhaps the immunity of the average Russian “Joe” from the global economic crisis is becoming a thing of the past.

Evgenii Kolesov, one of the jurors in the Politkovskaya murder trial, was on Ekho Moskvy today and said the following about the sudden closing of the trial to the media:

“I can’t say that the initiative originated from us.  In no way did any of us demand this,” the juror emphasized.  According to him, the court secretary came to the jury room before the trial and asked them to sign a request to conduct the trial without the press, but “yesterday no one signed this request.” Today, the jurors for the Politkovskaya case addressed the court with a request to allow the print media into the trial.

It appears that the plot is thickening.

For those of you in the New York area, I will be a participant in “What is Russia Thinking? The Word from the Last of the Independent Media.” The event is organized by the Paul Klebnikov Fund, a foundation started by the late journalist’s family, and the Eurasia Foundation to honor Mikhail Fishman, this year’s recipient of the Paul Klebnikov Prize for Excellence in Journalism. Fishman is the editor-in-chief of Russian Newsweek.  The panel will include a discussion between Fishman, Andrew Meier, Sarah Mendelson, and myself.

If anyone makes it to the event, be sure to come up and say hello.

An invitation for the event is available here.

From BBC in 2001.

Stalin and the Betrayal of Leningrad

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