The Constitutional COurt has now officially moved to St. Petersburg. Today is the first official day of residence for the 19 Constitutional Court judges who have moved from their previous court in Moscow to St. Petersburg.

All 19 Judges agreed to make the trip to the northern capital and they are awaited by a luxurious (if also rather creepy) set of cottage residences in the prestigious Krestovskii Island where they will all live in close proximity (one road leads to their little village). They also have a special sauna and medical facilities.

In what might suggest the continuing encroachment of executive power on the other branches of power in the Russian government, the ever expanding Presidential administration is moving into the former offices that the Constitutional court occupied until now.

At the same time, the move will lead to a net decrease in the number of assistants who aid the Judges in their work. A new (but decreased) number will be taken from the law faculty of St. Petersburg University (connected with Putin and others).

It remains to be seen whether geography really is destiny in determining the influence of the Constitutional court. If it is, the Constitutional Court has been both sidelined and placed in a tightly controlled setting where they can be controlled (the fact that they are all to live in such close proximity is disturbing).

Many have speculated that the election of Medvedev would be a boon for Gazprom in its ongoing business war with Rosneft over the Russian hydrocarbon industry. Today proved it.
Today, Gazprom received the massive gas field of Chayanda (which has been classified as one of strategic significance) without a tender. This flew directly in the face of Yuri Trutnev and the Ministry of Natural Resource's view that this massive field should be offered in a tender - therefore, giving Rosneft some leverage to gain more control of this field.

An interesting question to follow now will be the fate of Rosneft during a Medvedev administration. Will the Sechin-led Rosneft be downgraded and to be eventually absorbed by the national champion, Gazprom? Putin tried to merge Gazprom and Rosneft and failed - will Medvedev have the power to finally do this?

What about the publicly owned Lukoil? And Surgutneftegaz, which has remained very loyal to the Kremlin?

Today's move suggests that Medvedev is going to be aggressive in the pushing the interests of Gazprom - it is now possible that Gazprom will receive other gas fields without a tender (including Sakhalin 3).

Stay tuned.

Worsening conditions in Afghanistan have led America (through NATO) to once again engage with Uzbekistan.

1. History of relations

Readers will remember that the West (and America in particular) had engaged seriously with Uzbekistan during the post 9/11 buildup to the invasion of Afghanistan (Uzbekistan became a critical base for American warplanes). however, this accord broke down after America and the West widely criticized Uzbekistan for the human rights violations that accompanied the Andizhan massacre in 2005. This had led Karimov, the Uzbek President, to expel the Americans from the base in Uzbekistan and move more closely to Russia and China (partly facilitated by the Shanghai COoperation Organization). However, since that break down of relations, in the last year both the West and Karimov have had an increased dialogue.

2. Why? What has changed? Why have relations improved?

Reuters attributes this to an attempt to promote democracy:

"The West has stepped up contacts with Uzbekistan over the past year, hoping dialogue would lead the nation towards more democracy. U.S. Admiral William Fallon visited Tashkent in January in a first high-level attempt to mend ties since 2005."

I disagree. More likely, this is a realization by NATO and America that the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan is more important to their national interest than the human rights record of Uzbekistan. Indeed, there have been few - if any - moves by Uzbekistan to increase its pitiful human rights record since the dialogue began.

You'd hardly know it but the Russian Presidential elections are tomorrow, Sunday March 2nd. The most intriguing part of the day will be the turnout - what percentage of Russians will turn out and vote knowing that Dmitry Medvedev will be the next President?

One of the state owned television stations is running a story about the different attractions that are being offered at different polling stations to encourage Russians to come out and vote.

Here are a few of them:

1. In St. Petersburg, voters will get free disks and books signed by Russian actors, singers, and sportsmen.

2. In the Samara Oblast, they will be showing cartoons about heros going to vote at the polling stations in order to encourage parents with small children to come. They will also be handing out free scarfs to the children.

3. In Nizhnyi Novgorod, they will be entering people who vote into a lottery to win a new car. What car, you ask? Nothing less than the pride of the Russian automobile industry: a new Volga.

4. In Khaborovsk, every voter will be given a token which they will then be able to give to their children. The children will then bring this to school and the teachers will collect them. The school that collects the most will get a free excursion to the theater and will be recognized in the newspaper.

5. In Kazan, they will open a polling station in the major train station there where thousands of people will be traveling.

6. In Kaliningrad, all public transport will be free for the day. One of the authorities in Kaliningrad said "I want to create a holiday atmosphere. There will be music playing everywhere. "

7. In Sochi, voters will also be voting for the mascot for the Winter Olympic Games in 2014.

8. In Karachaevo-Cherkisia, all voters will get free haircuts.

9. Finally, for those who don't turn on the tv, radio, open the window, or read the newspaper, every mobile phone subscriber in Russia will receive a text message saying "Everyone to the polling stations!"

As the Ukraine-Russia gas dispute heats up and Russia is threatening to target missiles at Ukraine if they join NATO and help host US missile defense rockets, Putin has announced that he will be attending the NATO summit in April. This summit promises to be a highly contentious one (and not just because of Putin's attendance). Major questions will be discussed, including the NATO mission in Afghanistan, the expansion of NATO eastwards (particularly, its expansion further into former Soviet Republics like Georgia and Ukraine).

This is a surprising announcement for a number of reasons:

1. Most of all it is surprising because Putin will be traveling after the Presidential elections and Putin will be a lame duck - Medvedev's inauguration will be in May. Most experts think Putin will use this as a way of setting the tone of the relationship between the west and Russia on the eve of Medvedev's decision to take power. Others think it is a way of sending a message to Medvedev that he is in charge and that he doesnt plan to fade away from power, even after the elections and in his last days as president.

2. A major question will be this: will Putin's lame duck status stop him from resolving any problems? The reaction of the western members - who will most likely want to encourage Putin to step down from power - will be telling. They might try to treat him as a lame duck and refuse to really face any hard questions in the NATO-Russia relationship. Alternatively, they will use the forum to avoid further deterioration of relations. The latter is the most likely result.

However it turns out, the most important part of this visit will be symbolic. Putin will make his voice heard as President for the last time; NATO will get its last chance to communicate with the most combative Russian leader since Andropov. It will set the tone of the next four years of a Medvedev presidency.

Russia and America have long viewed each other through stereotypes, political rhetoric, and fear. On the Russian side, the image set forth by the political and (state controlled) media elite is America as a violent and rapacious expansionist power marauding through middle eastern countries, setting up missile defense shields on Russian borders, expanding NATO, and encircling Russia in a ring of military hardware. This vision helps galvanize political support in opposition to a seemingly omnipotent threat.
From the American perspective, political discourse encourages us to see Russia as dangerous, unstable country, hoping to return back to its Soviet roots, and looking for confrontation with the west.

Both versions are utter nonsense: Russians certainly do not want to go back to breadlines, inability to travel, and stagnating economy in order to get their pride on the international forum back. Similarly, America's policies are at best only partially aimed at Russia, many (like missile defense) are acknowledged as universally useless and do not threaten Russia at all.

These misperceptions of each other, however, serve the interests of political elites in both countries - they reinforce old cold war stereotypes that are comfortable and familiar. Yet, such rhetoric cannot hold up, as Russia has opened up to the world. Many of the American bloggers on the blogosphere have lived in Russia, know Russians, or have studied Russia; they cannot be so easily duped into thinking that Russia is the Soviet Union again (as they might have been during the Cold War or earlier when Russia was closed to the outside world). Alternatively, many Russians also understand the misleading nature of anti-American propaganda in Putinist politics.

A brilliant article from Gazeta.ru's Semen Novoprudsky demonstrates this increasing awareness on the Russian side . It suggests that Russia's criticisms of America are ultimately hollow: Russia essentially wants a version of American political stability, economic prosperity, and opportunity. There are no great ideological schisms; Russia and America are natural allies.

Novoprudsky is right. Both countries would do better to see the other in a more balanced light. And the only question is how quickly these stereotypes are wiped away and the two countries understand each other's flaws and strengths more clearly.

Today, the Duma is considering in its first reading a Bill "On the Internet" which proposes the creation of an Internet Technology Center. It also envisions the creation of an Association of Electronic Communication for the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the countries of the CIS (the loose confederation of successor states to the Soviet Union). Other CIS countries (like Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, or Belarus - who already have tight internet controls) could now work closely with the Russian watchdog (an ominous sign).

The government has of course been quick to argue that this body is simply created in response to the rising number of cyber crimes and, in particular, to curb increasing nationalist hate speech that is resounding across the Russian internet.

For instance, the head of the committee on constitutional lawmaking, Yuri Sharandin pointed out that it is "not only possible to regulate the internet but it is also necessary to regulate it." He said that the center would not engage in unconstitutional censorship, but simply "the punishment of legal violations, for instance, the distribution of child pornography, or racist or nationalist speech." Other regulated speech that was mentioned by Duma members was "information on how to make bombs,

However, as some critics have pointed out, the text of the law seems to be wider than this: the center is charged with regulate the "development and use of the internet."

Anton Nosik, a Russian internet expert, argues that this law raises dozens of questions. First, he thinks the creation of a watchdog might lead to the Chinese approach to internet use, in which users are limited access to certain sites.

Much is still to be determined, though, the Bill is up for a final reading in March.

A series of announcements recently by Medvedev and the United Russia party suggest that the government is now looking to exert more control over the culture industry in Russia.

1. Lenfilm, the old venerable Soviet film agency, is no longer to be privatized and will now be given aggressive state funding in order to create films that will have appeal not just in Russia but across the world.

2. The Russian Orthodox Church - almost certainly with Kremlin backing - is now creating a commission on morality in the media and will be rating television shows.

3. The Russian Duma is now considering a bill that will make it a finable offense to read pornographic material in public.

The interesting factor in these new cultural programs is the influence of the Russian orthodox church. The bill on pornographic material was introduced by a former Nashi member - and, as many of you know, Nashi has strong ties with the Russian orthodox church. Recent polls suggest that no more than 6% of Russians actually attend church on a regular basis. But does this mean that these programs will be a failure? I dont think so. In this sense, at least, Nashi's involvment with the Russian orthodox church gives us the answer: they are involved with the Church as a nationalist - not religious - enterprise. Thus, the Russian Orthodox Chruch has little effect on the average Russian's private belief, but could have a great deal of influence on his/her public attitudes to government/nation/leaders.

In this way, the Church will continue its paradoxical rise: despite very little religious belief, the Church will instead become a symbol of Russia nationhood and identity, thereby helping to create (if the authorities have their way) another secular style belief in the Russian state...

A law has been introduced into the Duma by the ever present Putin sycophant who also happens to be head of A Just Russia Sergei Mironov that will create a museum for Vladimir Putin studies. The law claims that the new institute will promote research based on Putin that will explore issues of Russia's place in the world, its future development, and its history. It also claims to be a way for future presidents to preserve their role in Russian life after they have finished their two terms.

This is an interesting development: it seems likely that this Institute will be another part in a growing network of governmental bodies that are supporting the new Putinism/sovereign democracy ideology which is now being touted as the gel for the development of the new Russia - and is Putin's new coalition for bringing together Russia and redefining its 'mission' in the world after the fragmentation of the post-communist 1990s. This ideology seems to be developing into a strange blend of continued capitalist reforms, Eurasianist ideology (Dugin, the Eurasianist thinker is now featured prominently in Kremlin propaganda and espouses similar ideas regarding Russia's use of landpower and what he calls a "conservative revolution" - one that seemingly preserves traditional Russian institutions while also brings about needed change), anti-Americanism (see Nashi's frequent attacks on America and on opposition politicians as being American), and good ole fashioned nationalism (this is mainly manifested through spending oil money on the army and "national projects", though here, there is a difficult struggle going on between those who are more and less willing to flirt with anti-immigration and racism in Russia as another plank in the Putin coalition). Much of this is leading to a renewed interest in the Tsarist empire and its less western oriented ideology...