<![CDATA[[iPutin] tag: famous]]> http://iputin.net/tag/famous Tue, 14 Oct 2008 18:00:44 +0000 iRatty Engine http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss <![CDATA[Grigory Pasko: Adventures in State Propaganda]]> http://iputin.net/article/93a701000c705f98536df2efcba66d08 http://iputin.net/article/93a701000c705f98536df2efcba66d08 kniga120308.jpgI recently read the latest book about YUKOS and Khodorkovsky. The author - a certain Vladimir Perekrest from «Izvestiya» - not only named it «What Khodorkovsky is sitting for» ["to sit" is the Russian equivalent of the American phrase "to do time" in jail--Trans.] (note that the title is not in the form of a question, because for him, Perekrest, it is obvious that the former head of YUKOS is sitting for good reason and justly), he also peppered the entire book with this phrase, every time attempting to fasten his arguments to it.

About the author. At the end of the book is written that this - is a «famous journalist, deputy editor of a department at «Izvestiya», that he has «broad erudition» and an «excellent style» and that this book - is the first in his glorious labor biography.

I read the book. From the very first page of the text the author tries to convince the reader that the trial of Khodorkovsky showed that «the power is stronger , the law is stronger». Here's a quote: «Having demonstratively punished the most mighty of the oligarchs, the president showed the others who's boss in the country». Here Perekrest himself kissed goodbye his book and any value it might have had: he absolutely justly asserts that in the criminal case against Khodorkovsky the president decided everything (then he was V. Putin), and not the law. The conclusion from the author's passage is simple and clear: in Russia there is no independent court, because it is precisely to a court that are given the powers to punish and to be merciful, and not to the president, no matter who he may be and what his personal attitude towards a figurant in a criminal case may be.

It is all the more so incomprehensible why after such an unwitting message the author hotly persuades us that Khodorkovsky is sitting justly?

Personally, later on the entire book is dedicated to the premise of how good the president is and how bad Khodorkovsky with his team from YUKOS is. As confederates the author takes for himself the following persons: «a knowing person», «a former employee of MENATEP», «the founder of one of the collectives», «a lad from the Kuban», «one of the female participants in the project», «one of the loyal subjects», «one such lobbyist», and so forth. Surnames are not named. Go ahead and try to check if these people exist in reality, or of they - are a figment of Perekrest's imagination.

And this just begs the question: if the power really is stronger and the law really is stronger, then why is the author so cowardly that he's afraid to name his witnesses?

It is also demonstrative that the author, painting a collective portrait of the company YUKOS, resorts exclusively to such phrases: «the team fiddled around [химичила]», «the dons of his family», «Khodorkovsky's empire», «coordinator of financial flows»... That is, he intentionally creates an image of a mafia. Moreover, a ruthless mafia, because the lion's share of the book is devoted to businessmen and bureaucrats, supposedly killed by Khodorkovsky's and Nevzlin's people. Of the most weighty, in the opinion of Perekrest, evidence of the involvement of the YUKOS managers in murders are the words of a certain Rybin. In so doing, what are cited are not even Rybin's own words, but a conclusion of the author: «Rybin is convinced that the contract for his elimination came from the very top of YUKOS». And that's all the evidence there is. Among the people this is called «one little old lady said...».

By the way, according to the witness of the lawyers of Lebedev, Pichugin, Alexanyan, Bakhmina, and Khodorkovsky, there's a whole slew of such «evidence» in the case files of their clients.

Here's a typical citation from the creativity of Perekrest: «Khodorkovsky makes money out of thin air. He comes up with dodgy schemes to get away from taxes, buys up enterprises on the cheap, then sells them, but already more expensively». Evidence in so doing - zero. But this doesn't stop the author from making such a conclusion: «Let's try and project the morals of «Menatep», YUKOS onto all of Russia:

The economy - built on fraudulent schemes for making money out of thin air.
National idea - getting around the law.
Internal life - tightest possible control by the Security service.
Argument in disputes with opponents - a bullet to the head.
Ideology - tremble, you worthless shit. ...In reality the well-being of Khodorkovsky was mixed up with two connected vessels: in one - oil, while in the other - blood».

The author rarely sinks down to specifics. Painting some kind of schemes of supposed getting away from taxes, he, intentionally as it were, doesn't write anything concretely.
If you attentively delve into what is written in the book, it is highly unlikely that you would understand what the point of these supposedly unlawful business dealings and schemes was. Because it is known: neither were there criminal cases started up with respect to bank «Menatep», nor were there trials prior to the arrest of Lebedev and Khodorkovsky...

In principle, the entire book by Perekrest - that «famous journalist» with his «excellent style», - is sheer propaganda, and not investigative journalism as such. The book is full of factual inaccuracies. One of them is such. Perekrest writes that «a tasty morsel from the loans-for-shares auctions of the year 1995 was the company YUKOS». In so doing, the author keeps silent about how in the year 1995 YUKOS was a loss-making company with huge debts and wage arrears. So it couldn't have been a tasty morsel. That's why it had been put up for loans-for-shares auction to begin with.

About these and other inaccuracies was said to the author on the air at «Radio Liberty» - there the presenters of the radio station literally smeared his position apart.

When I read the labor of the «famous journalist» with the «excellent style», I could not shake the feeling that the author had been given a task to paint a portrait of a loathsome character - the «greedy Khodorkovsky». Here's how the author describes «don» Khodorkovsky: «A plumpish, pasty young person with unkempt hair, with an excessive appetite for devouring hors d'oeuvres at petty merchants' parties...»

In so doing, the author placed at the end of the book a photo of Khodorkovsky, where it can be clearly seen that Mikhail was neither plumpish nor unkempt. Fuller than now, after five years of jail and colony, - yes, that he was.

There are in the book openly false messages and examples. Here's what's written about «Open Russia» - the foundation that YUKOS funded. The author writes: «The target audience - adolescents from 12 to 18 years... The task - the formation of a positive informational field around «open Russia». I [Grigory Pasko] was once at a seminar that was conducted by this foundation. There were no adolescents there. And the objective of the seminar was clearly not the formation of a halo around the foundation. So even here the author lied...

Another example. Perekrest writes that when Khodorkovsky ended up in the colony in Krasnokamensk, they «took to «chmurit'» [military slang term for abuse--Trans.] him to the max - the impression is such that the zeks and the administration are competing to see who will be more successful in this». Here every word - is a lie. I have actually spoken with many former inmates who sat together with Mikhail Khodorkovsky in the Krasnokamensk zone. Not one of them said a bad word about Mikhail Borisovich - they all spoke only respectfully. That's the first thing. Second, zeks never compete with the administration in anything, be it bad or good: that's not "by understandings" [по понятиям - the unwritten social rules of the criminal world, which are strictly complied with under pain of death--Trans.]. Third, the administration would not have dared on its own to abuse Khodorkovsky: only by command from above. Fourth, there's no such word as «chmurit'» in Fenya [underworld dialect--Trans.]. That's from the lexicon of draftee soldiers...

Examples of lies, distortions, omissions, insinuations - a multitude. If they are meant for idiots, then all that's left is to feel sorry for Perekrest - the «famous journalist « with the «excellent style». Oh yes, I've also forgotten to mention to readers that Perekrest - is a Companion of the Order «For personal courage». Seeing how in his first book he takes cheap shots at a person sitting in jail, you immediately understand: this is a very courageous person indeed. Very. Just like the ones who contracted him to write this book.

Top image: The cover of the latest book about Khodorkovsky (photoreproduction by Grigory Pasko)

Lower image: Vladimir Perekrest, a "famous journalist with an excellent style"
]]> Wed, 03 Dec 2008 08:00:00 +0000 author author takes bad khodorkovsky khodorkovsky author rarely sinks author hotly persuades greedy khodorkovsky mikhail khodorkovsky writes Grigory Pasko: Adventures in State Propaganda <![CDATA[The Kremlin's Fear of History]]> http://iputin.net/article/79cd6db3dcf0c0cb0d59652a6d00fc28 http://iputin.net/article/79cd6db3dcf0c0cb0d59652a6d00fc28 putin_kgb_112608.jpgA short while back I published an interview with Fredo Arias-King, in which we reviewed Russia's brief flirtation with lustration law - a debate which at the time tapped into that difficult area of the politics of memory.  The lustration example, and the state's resistance to it, was only the most recent in a variety of incidents which have illustrated Russia's particular discomfort before its own recent history.  Grappling with the past and coming to terms with exactly how much history is beneficial and how much is destructive to national unity is something encountered not only by most post-Soviet states, but also an unavoidable experience encountered by any country after the fall of one regime and the transition to the next. 

So it was with great interest that I read this article in the New York Times, titled Nationalism of Putin Era Veils Sins of Stalin's.  The article reports on the efforts of the beleagured historian Boris Trenin to uncover the mysteries of the disappeared under the reign of Joseph Stalin in the city of Tomsk, Siberia - but finds his research blocked by the administration, as the KGB files he is seeking to access have been sealed from public access.

What interest would the Kremlin have in denying public access to the archives of the Soviet Union?  What is behind this increasing effort to control the portrayal of history, manipulate the national memory, and, in some cases, whitewash the crimes of former leaders who have nothing to do with the current Russian Federation?

The shift in attitude toward archival access, and discussion of the crimes and abuses of the Soviet Union in general, is quite palpable.  I recall in the introduction to Steve LeVine's latest book, he visits the offices of the NGO Memorial, and compares the practically desolate operation of today with the bustling and lively center it was in the late 80s and early 90s (the offices and museum "buzzed with researchers, journalists, visitors, and foreign dignitaries" at a time when "curiosity about the Stalinist was intense.")

There is a long catalogue of issues highlighting the state's current perestroika in reverse: the television program "Zhdi Menya," the quickly forgotten fiasco of the Bronze Soldier in Estonia, the politics of identity with the Solovetsky Stone, the uncomfortably bellicose Victory Day parade which brought tanks back onto Red Square, and, of course, the now famous propagandistic new school textbook of Russian history produced by the Putin administration, which has softened the legacy of Stalin's Great Terror to the point of ambiguity.  Many news outlets have reported on a steady stream of state propaganda and television documentaries eulogizing Stalin, and I even recall the the recent online poll which placed his popularity as high as #2 for the most important Russian individual in its history, who was just barely beaten out by Peter the Great.  Some have suggested that this "beatification" of the genocidal Soviet is a sign of the public's desire for strongman stability.  Adrian Blomfield of the Telegraph wrote last summer:

For old Communists like Mr Usik, Stalin's name is synonymous with stability in a country that has not had much of it of late. (...) But they argue that it was a period in history when Russia needed a tough man at the top. And they argue that there is much more on the positive side of Stalin's ledger, particularly in the Great Patriotic War.

Likewise, the Times article interviews Vasily A. Khanevich, a colleague of the historian Trenin and an active member of Memorial, who explains the exceptionally contraditory position being established:

"Russia positions itself as a completely different democratic country with democratic values, but at the same time, it does not reject, it does not disassociate itself and does not condemn the regime that preceded it," he said. "On the contrary, it defends it."

So what exactly is the benefit for the current government to distort the past in this manner, and what do they have to fear from history?  The most obvious answer is that the state is concerned over its territorial and cultural integrity in the vacuum left after the Soviet Union, and is hard pressed to create as many binding issues of common identity as possible, which in some respects require harkening back to the collective memory - even it if means rehabilitating it.  There is undoubtedly an important political expediency to use history as a tool of nationalism - and this is not a trend unique to Russia.

Secondly, we have to take into account that the Kremlin has become overrun with former agents of the KGB, and its successor, the FSB.  It is a natural outcome of this institutional culture to prefer secrecy, control, and to hold little trust in the public.  Furthermore, there are high-ranking officials in the current government who may be tied to crimes of persecution - even Viktor Cherkesov, the famous spy who has come out to fight the clan of Igor Sechin, was well known as the man who arrested Andrei Sakharov.

But lastly and most importantly, this trend of hiding or whitewashing inconvenient history I believe represents a fundamental lack of confidence in the government's own legitimacy.  Opening the KGB archives, and allowing for discussion and possible efforts to bring grievances before courts of law over the abuses of the past regime would imply the emergence of some difficult questions.  This is a government that is very uncomfortable with questions, and unaccustomed to transparency. 

The people of the Russian Federation have a very strong history, colored by many notable figures and impressive achievements.  Unfortunately, this history is not without its darkness, as is the history of any country (I believe Germany, the United States, and Japan can attest).  There is no conceivable reason to believe that Russians don't have the confidence to withstand a thorough and true historical reckoning, and come out on the other end as patriots.  But this decision unfortunately is being made for them by the current leaders, who appear to lack this confidence and trust in their own legitimacy, in their citizens, in their nation, and their own patriotism.  I don't think we should look at the historical manipulation by the Kremlin as a power over the past to control the future, but rather an innate and self-debilitating fear to confront criticism.
]]> Thu, 27 Nov 2008 12:21:59 +0000 history recent recent history strong history russian history inconvenient history public public access access The Kremlin's Fear of History <![CDATA[Grigory Pasko: Memento Mori]]> http://iputin.net/article/f9c3de65dda4c735d2772b515026ae92 http://iputin.net/article/f9c3de65dda4c735d2772b515026ae92 On 17 November, on the day of the start of the trial of the persons accused of the murder of the famous journalist, "Novaya gazeta" observer Anna Politkovskaya, an acquaintance telephoned me and said: "Have you heard!? The trial will be open!"

I had already gotten so much accustomed to closed trials in Russia that I inadvertently said: "It can't be so!"


cemetery.jpg

Photo: Anna Politkovskaya's grave at Troyekurovskoye cemetery in Moscow (photo by Grigory Pasko)

Exactly in twenty-four hours, the Moscow district military court at the first session of the consideration of the case on the merits decided that the trial must take place in closed regime. The judge presiding at the trial, Yevgeny Zubov, clarified that this was done for the reason that the jurors are refusing to enter the courtroom in the presence of the press.

I have no words. It's just plain nauseating. I am nauseous because of those who adopt such decisions. And I understand: that's how it will be in my country for a very long time yet.

Recently I paid a visit ... to Anna. More precisely, to her grave, at the Troyekurovskoye cemetery.

At this cemetery I ended up for the first time. The pompous constructions in front of the entrance impressed me: beautiful, solidly made, for the ages... The flower kiosk, the little church for performing funeral services for the deceased, the hall for farewells, the gravestones for sale - everything, absolutely everything has been provided for. There's no skimping in the way this business is being run, everything has been well thought through. Even the mugs of the security guards are so broad, as if though especially so that nobody would question the seriousness and longevity of this business.

And then I saw the cemetery itself. A huge field of black and tasteless monuments, simply obtuse in their tastelessness. Like some field of dead intentions of good architects. Like a dragon's teeth that have sprouted, sprung like seeds - and all black, like they had already grown out rotten.

Nearly all the entombed - are military and cops. On the slabs are engraved their portraits in uniform, and from this the theatricality and absurdity of the spectacle only intensifies. And if you then inadvertently start to read the inscriptions as well ...

"Here rests ...great... deserving... Awarded orders and medals ..." "Advisor-legate 3 class... diplomat..." Lord, who needs their regalia THERE?

This is certainly not the poet Batyushkov with his epitaph: "No need for inscriptions on my stone, simply say here: he was and is no more!"

If we are to believe Mark Twain, the deceased adore reading gravestone inscriptions and epitaphs. Oh and how they no doubt snigger and laugh at them!

I recalled the poem of one author:

Смех берет от надписей дебильных          They make you laugh, the moronic inscriptions,
И поэтов, сочинявших их,                         And the poets who composed them
Тех, что нам на камушках могильных        Those who for us on little gravestones
Пишут глупое: "Трагически погиб".            Write stupidly: "Tragically died".

And suddenly, among the black field of tastelessness - a little island of brightness. This - the grave of the journalist Anna Politkovskaya. A white border, white pebbles, a stone slab over the grave, stylized to resemble a large sheet of paper, shot through in several places. Anna had been shot by a killer, whose hand had been directed by those who were intensely irritated by the journalist's articles. She wrote about the Russian power, about Putin and his accomplices, about the war in Chechnya and the fates of the Chechens... About closed trials.

A bright gravestone - as a symbol of Anna's bright soul. That's how it should be: white - for the white, black - for the black.

]]> Thu, 20 Nov 2008 13:39:01 +0000 anna journalist anna politkovskaya observer anna politkovskaya anna politkovskaya black field field journalist troyekurovskoye cemetery cemetery Grigory Pasko: Memento Mori <![CDATA[Adam Michnik: The Fear of Russia's Wrong Direction]]> http://iputin.net/article/1fe284eb6fb5760898b13be692b54f53 http://iputin.net/article/1fe284eb6fb5760898b13be692b54f53 Adam Michnik, one of Poland's foremost intellectuals and hero from the Solidarity movement. We also recently published a translation of another article from his most recent visit to Moscow. michnik111008.jpgPUBLIC LECTURES (Polit.ru) Russia, Poland, Europe A public discussion with Adam Michnik We are publishing the full transcript of a discussion with the famous European intellectual, one of the most famous Polish dissidents and political prisoners, editor-in-chief of “Gazeta Wyborcza” Adam Michnik, which took place on 25 October of the year 2007 in a club — the literary cafe Bilingua within the framework of the project «Public lectures of Polit.ru». The discussion was organized with the aid of the International society «Memorial». Adam Michnik was born in the year 1946. In 1961—1962 he entered into the famous discussion «Club of the crooked wheel», through which passed many representatives of the future political opposition, in 1962 he founded his own informal Club of seekers of contradictions. In 1964 he matriculated at the historical faculty of Warsaw university, he was on many occasions subjected to admonitions, in 1968, in a period of acute political crisis, he was arrested and sentenced to three years of jail confinement, released by amnesty in 1969 (student protest demonstrations against the expulsion of Michnik from Warsaw university gave a start to the March unrests of the year 1968, which were suppressed by the powers, which grew into a campaign of state antisemitism, entailing a mass emigration of Jews from the country). At that same time he began to get published as a journalist (under pseudonyms). He received a «wolf’s ticket» and could not continue studies, however in 1975 he completed extramurally the historical faculty in the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan. He was the personal secretary of the famous Polish poet and public figure Antoni Słonimski. In 1976—1977 he lived in Paris. Returning, he joined the Committee for the defense of workers (KOR) just founded by the opposition, he appeared as one of the organizers of the underground university of humanities and social sciences, he was editor of a series of opposition print publications — «Informational bulletin», «Kritika», one of the heads of underground publication. In 1980—1989 — expert of the Mazowian branch of the Solidarity movement. In 1981—1984 he was arrested, confinement, in 1985 he was arrested anew, sentenced to three years of jail. Since 1988 — a member of an informal coordination committee, which was headed by Lech Wałęsa, a member of the Committee of citizens, in 1989 — a participant in a series of meetings of the government and the opposition (the «Round table») on the holding of free elections, in 1989—1991 — deputy to the newly-elected Sejm. In 1989 he founded and since that time heads the daily«Gazeta Wyborcza» - the leading Polish independent mass information medium. He supported the program of economic reforms of Leszek Balcerowicz. He appears in support of the democratic movement in various countries. Boris Dolgin. One Polish colleague said to me very recently: «You think that we’re waiting for you in Europe? On the contrary. We will resist to the end, if Russia tries to get into the EU or into NATO». He had in mind not his position, but the opinion of the people. Adam Michnik. This was my president? (Laughter) Boris Dolgin. No. By the same token Lech Kaczyński - is not my colleague. How do different circles in Poland see in some kind of ideal world the place of Russia? That same question – to you personally. Is this someplace close? Or the opposite? What do you want to see from Russia? Adam Michnik. First, I want to thank you for being able to meet here with you in a close circle, like in the kitchen. As concerns the question, I would say this: there is no typical Pole. He doesn’t exist. We have different points of view on Russia. There is both Russophobia, and a historical complex. There is misunderstanding and fear. A fear not that Russia will go tomorrow into Poland, which we feared in the year of ’81. But for the last 20 years we believed that Russia is going on a good road. None of us thought that a return to imperial thinking was possible. (We – this is the real anti-Soviet Russophiles). With various back holes, through pitfalls, one step forward, two steps back. Therefore people were doubly shocked. The first time – this is the Khodorkovsky case, the second – this is the Caucasus, Georgia. You may ask: «Why Georgia, and not Chechnya? Why the Khodorkovsky case, and not the murder of Starovoitova?» Because we know perfectly well from modern history that the road from communism to democracy – this isn’t a stroll down Nevsky prospekt. And there will be problems in all countries. From my point of view, from the point of view of a Polish democrat, it is obvious that the place of a democratic Russia – is in the structures of the European democratic world. Why? There is no European culture without Russian culture. Without Gogol, Pushkin, Tolstoy, Turgenev and others. And there is no European culture without Russian music: Glinka, Shostakovich, etc. Second. From the Polish point of view, historically the greatest threat for us were conflicts with our neighbors: with Russia and with Germany. A positive scenario – this is good relations with Russia and with Germany. Third. Psychologically, by his nature, a Pole is very close to a Russian person. One of our diplomats said that Poland is closer to the Germans. I asked him: «Do you read Russian novels or German ones, do you listen to German music or to Vysotsky and Okudzhava? Where is it closer for you? Can you get yourself soused with vodka so well with Germans? No, you can’t». This is obvious. To continue. I would say that there is a connection between the domestic policy of the power in Russia and the external policy. It is obvious that all the nationalistic propaganda in Poland, which we have been looking at for two years, was very exotic. This was an exotic uniting of post-solidarity, post-communists, and post-fascists. They were looking for any opportunity to inflame ethnic emotions. We saw this in the plainly Russophobic rhetoric. This was the language of nationalism. The same thing was with Lithuania. The problem here is in the language. And, observing from this point of view, I see that in 20 years after the fall of communism there has arisen a new model of threat to the democratic order. This, primitively speaking, is the choice between «putinism» and «berlusconism». Putinism – this is power where there exists centralization, the annihilation of the opposition and independent media, the annihilation of the market economy in the sense of intervention in normal market property. When our «twins» came to power, I said to two of our Polish oligarchs: «Now you need to run away to London, Kiev, to China or someplace else». Because this power needs its Khodorkovsky. One left - and is alive. The second didn’t leave, and now he is nearly annihilated. Question from the audience. They locked him up? Adam Michnik. No. He left at the last moment, and then there were new elections already. The procurator didn’t find evidence of his guilt. I look very critically now at the policy of the Kremlin. But I am convinced that the natural interests of Russia and the potential enemies of Russia – this is not Europe and not the USA. This is either Islamist fundamentalism, or China, if something goes awry there. Igor Chubais. The enemies of Russia – this is its power. Adam Michnik. This is a complex question. What can I find in newspaper rhetoric? That the enemy of Russia – this is either the Ukrainians, or the Georgians as of today. But enemy number one – this is the USA. From my point of view, this is complete absurdity. I know the American elite a little bit. They don’t understand to the end what Russia is. Boris Dolgin. Could it not be that the reason they see an enemy in the USA is because this incomprehension comes through in certain of their actions, and it can lead to inappropriate actions? Adam Michnik. I think that in the Kremlin they know perfectly well - the USA don’t want war with Russia. But for 70 years there was constant anti-American propaganda. This is already like a code. Like in Poland with Germany. If you want to have a boost in ratings, you’ve got to say that you see revanchism in Germany. Only because some idiot said something. But if you look at what is taking place today in Hungary and in Slovakia, you’ll see similar mechanisms. I’m afraid that in our countries power could end up in the hands of demagogues. We need to make a coalition. For example, a Slovak-Hungarian coalition against idiots from both sides of the border. I’d like to tell one story. This was 5-7 years ago. Ludmilla Alexeeva and I were invited to an awarding of Tomas Venclova, the famous poet. She asked me what I thought of general Jaruzelski. I introduced them. It was very interesting to listen to the conversation of the famous Russian heroine of the democratic movement with the communist general, who had been dictator in Poland. He speaks Russian very well. For me, this talk became yet another proof that you’ve got to talk. Every conversation makes us wiser. Boris Dolgin. Thank you. Much is said in our country about the need to talk. There was a document of «Memorial» about historical memory - «On national images of the past». One of the moments actively used for the creation of tense relations between Russia and Poland, Russia and Ukraine, etc. – this is «historical politics». What is your position in this regard? Adam Michnik. I don’t like state historical policy in general. When I first read in Poland that the state was going to have a new historical policy, I wrote an article where I quoted from the meeting of Stalin with the director of the picture «Ivan the Terrible», Sergei Eisenstein. I said: «Historical state policy has shown its teeth». On the other hand, it’s obvious that there are different ideological and political circles that do have a historical policy. This I support. Without a knowledge of the past we will go forward like a blind child. We need to know why Poland lost at the end of the 18th century, what was Polish anarchism, etc. We need to know the truth. But if the premier or the parliament has the opportunity to decide – this is the first step towards catastrophe. And from this point of view I criticize historical policy. But there is another aspect as well. We say that we need to understand completely what was communism or fascism. This is very important. But what happened in Poland? We have a notion that communists and fascists were either foreigners, or traitors to the Motherland. That is, this was not Poles. This is a very dangerous thought. Because if we, Poles, are genetically incapable of a totalitarian philosophy, then we don’t need to fear either. You can say and do what you want. After all, you’re a democrat by nature! Today I look at the trial of general Jaruzelski, and I am ashamed for my country. This is a scandal, a cynical political game. More cynical than regular politics, which are already cynical as it is. This is a road not to the truth, but to revanche and to a state of suspicions, fear and hatred. If for an assessment of my life it is important what the KGB people – our hangmen – wrote, this is the posthumous victory of the KGB. You will not have my approval for this. This is not historical policy. This is cynical police politics, when with the aid of police archives they annihilate their rivals. Did you see what happened with Kundera? I saw that in Russia is translated and published Kundera’s brilliant novel «The farewell waltz». You read too - and you’ll see how you can kill a person with the aid of unreliable archives. Or this is a policy of hysteria, with the aim of inflaming hysteria and finding an enemy! And then all will be well! As a historian, I’ve read a bit about the history of bolshevism. And I know that there’s no end to this. If you’ve started out this way, you’ve got to constantly seek and unmask opponents. The criminalization of the opponent is implemented as well. He’s already not my opponent – he’s been criminalized, he’s a bandit! This is typical of Stalin and of our extreme rightists in Poland. Ludmilla Alexeeva. How much does this hounding of the general enjoy support in Poland? Igor Chubais. And to this same question. Had martial law not been introduced in the year of ’81, did Poland have a chance then to hang on and break the totalitarian regime? Adam Michnik. I consider that such an opportunity did not exist. I’d like to add something. Now these procurators are carrying on complete absurdity. They’re saying that there was no threat of Soviet intervention. That is, Poland was a completely sovereign state. That means, Brezhnev was right, saying that Russia never had attempts to carry out an intervention. I recently read the transcript of a meeting in October of the year ’56. Then, Khrushchev, Molotov, and, I think, Mikoyan came to Warsaw and exerted pressure so that they wouldn’t elect Gomułka to 1st secretary. A plenary session was going on right then in the CC. They came and wanted to go into the hall, in order to tell the members of the CC who should be elected. Ours said: «No. This is our sovereign decision». And Khrushchev bellowed: «Polish newspapers are writing that we’re exerting pressure». But Gomułka replied: «Yes. Because you are exerting it!» To answer Ludmilla. I’ll say it like this. There isn’t great enthusiasm. But the situation is changing. For now there is a split in Polish society on the topic of whether or not to try the general. He is holding himself in court with great dignity. He is higher than all his procurators as a person. Ludmilla Alexeeva. He considers that his conscience is clear. Adam Michnik. This is even more complex. He said this: «I know that martial law – this was an evil. But this is a lesser evil than civil war or Soviet intervention». Of course, your generals are saying that they would never have gone into Poland. But when I came to Moscow in the year of ’89, everybody was telling me: «We didn’t go in only thanks to the general. This is our and your good fortune». And then I had the opportunity to ask three members of the Politburo about this: Yakovlev, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. They all said: «If it had continued like that for another 2-3 months, we would have gone in». Boris Dolgin. Those who read Soviet newspapers in the years 1980 – 1981 will be able to confirm that the rhetoric was getting nastier incrementally. I was reading newspapers already then and can say that the formation of harsh criticism was very strong. Viktor Kogan-Yasyn. In the year of ’81 I was at three-month military musters after university. During the time of the taking of the military oath our commander was forced to pronounce the following words: «Our army now is fulfilling its international duty in Afghanistan and, if needed, we will be fulfilling it in Poland as well». Adam Michnik. Thank you. I don’t understand how there are people living in Poland right now who don’t understand this. I remember perfectly well how we were afraid. Further. There is one person. He was among my favorite dissidents. One of his books was my bible. This is Bukovsky. And in October or September of the year of ’81 he said that he was absolutely convinced: there would be an intervention. But now he’s written that there was no opportunity whatsoever for an intervention. He despises the general so much that he’s prepared to admit that Brezhnev would have been better for Poland. Stanislav. I would like to return to your thought about the creation of a coalition against idiots. In its time, as it seems to me, all the negotiations of the year of ’89 and beyond were precisely such a coalition against idiots in Poland. Now it can be seen that it’s simply easier for idiots to declare any compromise to be treason, to declare that behind it stood some kind of understandings etc. This is simple - and people, as can be seen, believe in this. What mechanism do you see in order that such a coalition could hang on for a long time? Adam Michnik. We will not find a guarantee of victory in any book. But we need to hold to a smart and correct road. In Poland everything is going in different ways. But Poland differs from Russia in that our «putinists» have not destroyed a real alternative in politics. And here I see the main problem for Russia. In fact, there is no alternative in Russia now. You can come back at me and say that in the Ukraine there is an alternative and it’s still a total mess. This is true. But then nobody has ever learned how to swim without getting into the sea. These problems will exist. There will be many of them. But the road to democracy, in my opinion, - this is the only road for Russia. About the coalition. I am asked why I love to come to Moscow. This is because a coalition between the smart people of Russia and Poland is needed both by Russia and by Poland. That’s my answer. And when will the victory be? Sergey Adamovich and I were at one conference together. And Sergey Adamovich very firmly said to us there what he thought. I answered him thus: «Sergey! If 30 years ago someone had said to us that we could talk with one another as free people in an independent Lithuania, we would have said that this person – is insane». In order to understand history you need to understand that there are surprises, unexpected things. Who would have thought that there would be a September 11 in New York? That there would be a catastrophe on the bourse now? Nobody. Pavel Kudyukin. As a person of leftist-democratic, socialist convictions I’m very concerned that in Russia the public moods and the political sector are sharply skewed to the right. That which by misconception is called «leftists» here, – this is very strange people, singing the praises of feudalism. Is it the same in Poland? Adam Michnik. Absolutely the same. It’s like that in all the countries of the post-Soviet space. Pavel Kudyukin. I had the experience of interacting with Polish leftists. They create the impression of European leftists. This is not a mass phenomenon? And the rest – post-feudals? Adam Michnik. I also look - and not only at Poland, but at Czechia, at Hungary, at Ukraine. This is a wave of rightist ideas. I don’t have an unambiguous answer as to why this is so. Maybe because that’s the way the winds are blowing in the world today. After the Portuguese revolution, the rightist conservative party took the name of the social-democratic party. Maybe this is a response to the language of the Soviet epoch. People are looking for something new from the point of view of a system of values. That is they’re pushing socialism aside. And the thesa is that socialism – this is relativism, while we need to hold on to hard values: Catholicism, Islam, etc. That we do have. But, in my opinion, this is a good language for a pre-election campaign. We have a strong Catholic church. But in practice this is just idle talk. That’s the first answer. The second is like this. From my own personal point of view, the repartitioning into leftists and rightists began with the English revolution, and ended with the Bolshevik one. Then there was a conflict between those who defended totalitarianism and those who criticized it. I think that there’s a bit of a masquerade here. Some say: we are liberals, others: we are democrats etc. But this means nothing practically. We now have to go over to a new challenge. What will be with the EU, with Russia, what will the relations between the EU and the USA be like? What does the trend of the EU’s xenophobia against immigrants mean? And, finally, where does the market economy end and state intervention begin? This doesn’t have anything in common with the classical division int rightists and leftists. And one more thing. I think that now the truth is in the conflict between open and closed societies. Tatiana Vorozheykina. Who in Poland, from the sociological point of view, votes for Kaczyński? And why did they come to power precisely in the year 2004? Adam Michnik. First, this is villages and small towns. This is people of the older generation, who fear confrontation with the new. Further. There is «Radio Maryja». This is extreme right Catholic nationalistic radio. But this is a specific nationalism. They never criticize Kremlin policy. Boris Dolgin. They even, to the best of my recollection, have their own branch in Saint Petersburg. And they don’t contact badly with Orthodox radicals. Adam Michnik. This is interesting. This is the only Polish radio that has received permission to have its transmitters in the Urals. And there’s no need to explain to you who can adopt such a decision. They think that liberals should be «killed». Liberals – this is rootless cosmopolitans, traitors to the Motherland - and they need to be annihilated. Who else? There is a very interesting problem of generations. A new generation has come. And they think, why do these old people, ones like Wajde [Wajda] or Michnik, look so important in the cinema, on the radio etc. They say that they’ve got such a slogan: TBM – Now, fucking, us. This is very important. This new generation has a dual complex. On the one hand, they’re against liberals, because they’re seeking hard values. On the other hand, they’re very cynical, ideal-less. But they do want money, power, etc. And all together this gives power to Kaczyński. After all, in politics nobody tells the whole truth. But in general they plainly lie. And this is a signal that you don’t need to study, don’t need to understand, who is Hegel, Plato or Dostoyevsky. What’s important? That Hegel was a German, that Dostoyevsky was a Russian, while Plato was a homosexual. And that’s sufficient. You don’t have to think. Why read?! This is very dangerous, but it exists. Last story. Unlikely conflict. From the PiS party they kicked out the «third brother-twin», Ludwik Dorn. Why did they kick him out? Because he divorced his wife. This is dangerous for a Catholic. One of the leaders said that here there is a moral problem, inasmuch as he was paying his first wife child-support for a child, say 3000 zloty. The second wife also has a child. And he submitted a letter to the court with a request to pay less for the first child. How is this possible?! For the first child?! There’s no place for him in our party! This person was the chief of the parliamentary faction. And now already his wife is saying that he’s paying even less. This is simply the folklore of Polish politics. But until now this was impossible. Such intervention in personal life. This exists. And this is the victory of Kaczyński. And one more thing. The Kaczyńskis – this is people of my generation. We’re acquainted since back in «Solidarity», since the underground. We have one model of political culture – this is the time of the communist power. When I hear his speeches – this is as if though I’m listening to Gomułka. The same political rhetoric. Those same insinuations. «We know these people! We know this opposition from the salon!» What exactly is a salon – nobody knows. Kaczyński, probably, knows. But he won’t tell. This is the banalization, tabloidization and primitivization of public debates. But this very much attracts all people of low intellectual level. Retort from the hall. That commander could have said a lot of things. This doesn’t mean that the Politburo decided to introduce troops. Boris Dolgin. The commander wouldn’t have said it without a special installation [instruction?]. You don’t know the Soviet army. Retort from the hall. I know the Soviet army, inasmuch as I’ve been engaged in the Union [studying the USSR?] for a long time. It seems to me that a decision of the Politburo and public opinion – this is completely different things. The Politburo, after all – this is a serious organization. If they had decided something, the commander wouldn’t have found out about it. Adam Michnik. Do you know the history of the incursion into Czechoslovakia and into Afghanistan? The decision was adopted on the last night. But the commanders knew. And nobody said that there had been a decision. Retort from the hall. I just want to say that «the commander said» – this is not a historical argument. But the question is like this. I always get doubts when Poles talk about their relations with the USSR. After the Second World War Poland – this is as if though everybody’s victim. But after all, in the year 1932, the USSR and Poland entered into a pact on friendship, in ’35 – Poland abandoned this pact and started to be friends with Germany. In ’38 – when they entered into the pact in Munich, Poland refused to permit the USSR to introduce troops, in order to help Czechoslovakia in the event of war. Furthermore, when the Germans went in there, the Poles went in after them. About all this they are silent. Everything starts with the history of the war. What is your attitude towards this? Adam Michnik. First, I have a bad attitude towards what you have said. This is untrue. We in Poland printed a lot about Munich and about the disgraceful intervention in Czechoslovakia. As concerns denying the USSR in the request to introduce troops – then this is an astonishing question. After all, they knew that when the Soviet troops would come in, they would already not leave. That’s how it was in the Baltic states, in Bessarabia. Retort from the hall. They left from Bulgaria, Austria, Norway, Czechoslovakia. Adam Michnik. Czechoslovakia they did leave, but then they went in. And there they built a totalitarian regime, which they controlled to the end. I have already said that we’ve got a trend in historical policy, as if though we had not been guilty of anything. Of course, this is a historical lie. But this is not yet doctrine. Possibly, thanks to the fact that many are not in agreement with this. We have an idea for a law about criminal liability for the opinion that the Polish people bears guilt for the Holocaust or for Stalinist crimes. Thanks to the protest of the intelligentsia, this law was annihilated. I don’t want to work as the lawyer of our rightists, for whom I’m «enemy No. 1». But it must be said that this isn’t only Polish insanity. The French parliament voted for [a law saying that] all who dispute the Holocaust or the Armenian tragedy, – are criminals. This too is absurdity. I think that you’ve got something like this in any country. Of course, in Poland there are xenophobes and nationalists, who say all sorts of stupid things. But, you know, if we’re talking about the ‘30s, then we shouldn’t compare the semi-dictatorship of the Polish colonels with the Stalinist regime. Retort from the hall. I’m not comparing. Adam Michnik. You’re talking about Polish violations. Take a look at what was going on in the USSR. Boris Dolgin. A question to define things more precisely. In the «Memorial» document that has been mentioned, there was an idea about how a historical forum is necessary, where representatives of different cultures and countries would be able to clarify such acute questions amongst one another. In what kinds of forums could this be? Are you prepared to support this? Adam Michnik. Absolutely. We do this every year. We as a newspaper organize a conference and invite people from Russia. Whom didn’t we have! We had both Gleb Pavlovsky, and Sergey Kovalev and others. The last time we invited Sergey Karaganov, some people from Lithuania, Georgia and Ukraine. It was very interesting. For us this, maybe, isn’t very pleasant, because from a very cultured, educated person we heard phrases that we knew perfectly well from Kaczyński. The cast of mind of Kaczyński and of Karaganov is similar. But about this everybody has to speak as much as possible. And part of the enmity is going to go away. Alexander Guryanov. What is your attitude towards the utterance of Jaruzelski, which I read recently? When they in connection with the start of the trial asked him, had he indeed introduced martial law in order to stop a Soviet incursion, he replied: «Don’t ascribe an odious utterance to me. The main goal was to prevent economic catastrophe». Adam Michnik. Here’s what I think. He has a very specific psychology. He wants to tell the truth. But his truth was like this: the only place for Poland in Europe – this is alliance with the USSR. There is no other place. But what’s the most important thing? He was a Polish pro-communist pro-Soviet politician. But precisely pro-Soviet, and not Soviet. He was not an agent. Second. Of course, the communists had an interesting schizophrenia. They were all afraid of the Union, but nobody talked about this openly: neither Tito, nor Dubček. Nobody spoke openly. Of course, he was afraid of economic catastrophe. And he doesn’t want for people to think now that he was anti-Soviet. He wasn’t like that. Besides this, he was afraid that the result of economic catastrophe would be an uprising or a revolution in Poland. And the result of an uprising will become Soviet intervention. It’s very strange to me that now I’m working as his lawyer, after all, all my life I was his enemy. Thanks to him I twice sat in jail. But I think like this. We had blamed the communist regime, because right doesn’t exist there. Looking now at this trial, I think that it is purely political. And I would like that in a democratic, independent Poland everything would be different. I remember perfectly well the trials where I was on the defendants’ bench. This was simply a theatrical play. It was understandable right from the beginning how it all would end. But today, after 30 years, after martial law, you can’t judge the person who opened the door to peaceful transformation from communism to democracy. And we, the Poles, were the first. Of course, without perestroika none of this would have happened. What are our rightists saying today? That this is a tragedy! That we betrayed the Motherland. Without the general this would have been impossible. Boris Dolgin. And without him it’s unlikely that free elections would have taken place. I remember one of your phrases in the year of ’89. You said: «We at the given moment have come to power. Now the question, what to do next?» Precisely this was not obvious. Adam Michnik. Yes, of course. I am prepared to defend him from the moral point of view, and from the political, and from the legal. They are accusing him of having prepared a group, which worked against the state order. In our country this [is an] article of criminal law against the mafia. One of my Muscovite friends, whom I respect greatly, could not understand why I’m against. But he’s guilty! I asked him: «What would you say if today Medvedev and Putin were judging Gorbachev? For Tbilisi, for Vilnius? For Kovalev, who was still sitting [in jail] for a certain time?» And he didn’t say anything. You need to understand the very complex history of our countries. Stalin said about the French and Italian communists that this is «parliamentary cretinism». Now I’m against legal cretinism. We need to understand that there is the law, but that there is also history. Question from the hall. And what is Wałęsa’s attitude towards all this? Adam Michnik. They’re already accusing Wałęsa himself, that he had been a KGB agent. I once was the first to write an article, why I won’t vote for him. He insulted, berated me. Now we’re the best of friends, because I wrote an article about how he had not been an agent. He was a bad president, he had megalomania, he asserted that he alone had defeated communism (I asked: «Well, maybe, not alone after all? Maybe, someone else helped a bit?»), but he was not an agent. And it has to be said that this again is the folklore of Polish politics. We’ve got success, after all. The peaceful dismantling of a totalitarian system. We didn’t have what was in the Polish republic between the wars, where they killed the president, where they locked up the leaders of the opposition in jail. We didn’t have anything resembling that. This is unbelievable success. And what do Poles say? That general Jaruzelski – this is a Soviet agent, Wałęsa – an agent of the Polish special services, while the round table – this is a compromise between the KGB and the UB of Poland?! But this is simply horsefeathers. This is unbelievable absurdity. In Poland anything’s possible. Igor Chubais. First, I simply want to make a bow before you. For many in Russia, and for me among them, you have been an example. We’re trying here to hear what you’re saying. It is very important to us what is going on in Poland and in the Ukraine. These are very close countries, and information from there is the most censorable. The quantity of questions that arise at Polish-Russian meetings is inexhaustible. Therefore, maybe, we shouldn’t let you go to Venediktov? But I’ll be brief. Two brief questions. You spoke about the absurdity of a possible trial of Gorbachev. But when Yeltsin told him: «Dissolve the party - and you’ll remain president», he signed an ukase before everybody’s eyes and dissolved the party. When they aimed rifles at Nicholas the Second, he didn’t say that he repents and is joining the RCPB. He accepted death. Retorts from the hall. But nobody offered him an alternative. Furthermore, he had already abdicated by that moment. Igor Chubais. He had abdicated. I’ll say that he abdicated because most of all he feared civil war in Russia. And he abdicated from power, in order to avoid war. But Vladimir Ilyich for the sake of power unleashed it. It is still not appreciated here to this day who Lenin was, and who – Nicholas was. But nevertheless questions. You said, on the examples of the Khodorkovsky case and Georgia, that Putin is starting to get imperial thinking. Adam Michnik. Imperial and authoritarian. Igor Chubais. If we consider that imperial thinking – this is horrible, for us, in Russia, there wouldn’t be a history. And in so doing you said that without Russian culture there is no Europe. So to blame pre-October Russia for everything, to my view, is incorrect. I consider that what is returning is not imperial, but Stalinist thinking. And this is Stalinism. We have yet to appreciate that Russia was nu many ways successful as a state. While the USSR was a catastrophe. And it seems to me that what is returning is precisely Stalinist thinking. And second. Today it is countries like Georgia, Estonia and Poland that are appearing most actively against the Kremlin. I recall the Soviet times, when all the neighbors of the USSR were starting to build socialism. The only country that wasn’t building, – this is Finland, it also never made anti-Soviet declarations. It attained the biggest successes in the economy. And today, when Georgia, Estonia and Poland are starting to make noise, – this can end sadly. I don’t understand why America, France, Germany are silent. They see the absence of law, democracy, corruption etc. Why are they silent? It would be more advantageous for all if Estonia did its thing and didn’t stick its nose into politics. But huge countries have to speak. I’m grateful to the USA because under the Union they helped dissidents. But Estonia isn’t going to do anything here. Adam Michnik. This is both an interesting question and interesting evidence. The history of Russia – this is truly the history of an empire. But the history of Russian thinking – this is the history of freedom. There were the Decembrists, Herzen, Chaadayev. I recently read a book by the Polish historian Andrzej Walicki, a wonderful specialist on the history of Russian philosophy of the ‘30s-‘40s of the 19th century. He’s the son of a professor, who had been in the underground Armija Krajowa. He writes: «My path to free thought – this is the letters of Russian writers and philosophers». Why do I speak Russian? Thanks to Russian dissidents. When I wanted to read Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn and others, that’s when I learned the Russian language. You say that Estonia, Poland and Georgia are interfering in politics. You believe that Great Georgia attacked little Russia? Or Finland in the year of ’39? But this is simply the language of propaganda. I read during the time of the Georgian conflict articles in Russian newspapers. This was a language I remember well after the intervention into Czechoslovakia. The same arguments. Igor Chubais. That means, this is Stalinist policy? Adam Michnik. Hold on. Why isn’t it Stalinist? Because if there were no rights, we wouldn’t be sitting here. Under Stalin there was a totalitarian regime. There were no places for free talk. Take a look at these books around us! I just bought around 40 kg of books, issued under Putin. Under Stalin this was impossible. Do you remember the history of «The Master and Margarita»? Now you can read whatever you want. This is true, that in Estonia, as in Poland there are many insane and stupid acts. But after all, Estonia isn’t threatening Russia! This is absurdity. Concerning the difference between Poland and Finland. We in Poland dreamed about having the kind of status that Finland had. It wasn’t we who decided that in Poland socialism was going to be built, but a Stalinist regime. These were simply two different Stalinist policies. One – for Finland and Austria, the other – for the rest. The only exception was Yugoslavia. After Budapest and Czechoslovakia, we in Poland understood perfectly well where the boundaries of our possibilities were. If we look cynically, then what was the most successful moment in Russian history? This was Joseph Stalin. But you need to go on and ask what was the cost of this for Russia. Ludmilla Alexeeva. It turned out that in relation to the war of Georgia and Russia you agreed with your president. In that this was not good on the part of Russia. But what is the attitude of the populace to this? Adam Michnik. This is true. For the first and, probably, the last time in my life I supported the president. I asked myself the question, what would I have done in his place? I would also have gone as well with a quartet of presidents to Tbilisi and would have said: «You can’t do that». This is dangerous for everybody. And, first and foremost, for Russian democracy. I remember perfectly well what happened with Herzen after the Polish uprising. He was marginalized, while Mikhail Katkov took power over minds into his hands. What is the attitude towards the war in Poland? There was an internal conflict between the president and the government. In the government there is such a philosophy: «We don’t need to support the thought about how Poland – this is a center of Russophobia». And I agree with this. But what happened in Georgia, - this was outside of principles. Bombs on Poti and Gori – this is a new signal for all of us. I have never supported Saakashvili. I worked in Tbilisi a year ago as moderator between the government and the opposition, when Saakashvili shut down the telecompany «Imedi». I had an interesting talk with him. There is a story about how they asked Karl Radek about his relations with Stalin? He replied that it’s very complex to speak with him: you give him – a citation, and he gives you – a reference. That’s what my talks with Saakashvili were like. He lied so unbelievably! This was one great lie. That he would like, but he can’t, that, don’t you know, an independent court had decided thus (in Georgia - an independent court!). (Laughter) At the end I finally said: «Mister president, I see that what is taking place is a misunderstanding. You, maybe, think that I have come from Norway or from Australia? I’ve come from Poland and know all your bolshevik gimmicks perfectly well. Say plainly, what will be! Or say that you don’t want to talk about this! I’ll return to Warsaw and will write in the «New York Times» about what I saw and what I think about this». He said: «Oh come now! We’ll open it!» And they opened the station. For two weeks. Grigory Shvedov: That is he did lie after all? Adam Michnik: Lied again. I saw Georgia and spoke there with different people. And, of course, I have no sympathy for Saakashvili. I’ll say even more - that during the time of this conflict he behaved himself like a mad adventurist. But he was a victim of the situation and of a provocation. Boris Dolgin: But the decision was his after all? Adam Michnik: Probably. Not the Americans’! (Laughter) In Washington they were in a hysteria: what’s he doing, what’s he doing?! But this is simply Russian propaganda drivel! What honor to have victory over Georgia? But over Washington, over the West - such a success for the Kremlin! But this is absurdity. I am a hundred percent sure. What do the Poles think? First, nobody harbored any sympathies for Saakashvili. And until the moment of the incursion of the Russian troops into Georgia itself already, into Gori - not into Ossetia - they reasoned thus: he got what he wanted. But after the incursion everybody understood: this is already another question. And when we heard the Russian propaganda - about genocide in Tskhinvali and so on - this is such an obvious lie after all. This, I agree, was already Stalinist propaganda. Although practice - no. If it had been Stalinist practice, then what would have happened with the Georgians was what once was with the Ingushes, the Chechens, the Volga Germans. Boris Dolgin. The practice is such that now beyond the confines of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia there are no more Russian troops. Adam Michnik. There aren’t troops. But there is an independent Ossetia, where the entire government – this is KGB people from Moscow. Thanks for such sovereignty! Retort from the hall. Before the war there was the same thing there. Sergey Kovalev. I’m not going to ask the question that’s constantly twirling around on my tongue. We’ll talk about this in Poland. I will only designate it. I wanted to ask about KOS-KOR and about «Solidarity». And now I’ll take advantage of the opportunity for two brief retorts. The first on account of general Jaruzelski. I agree with everything. But I want to bring attention to the following. There is a court and there is a court sentence, and then there is the juridical qualification of an action. This is different things. And the juridical qualification is sometimes very useful. Let us say I promised my investigator that in his trial I will be a public defender. But this does not mean that I wouldn’t like there to be a trial with respect to our trials. God be with them, with the judicial sanctions. What’s important is the court decision. And second. On account of the «Finlandization» of the small countries of Europe. Let’s consider that all the countries of the world community have equal rights. In ’68 and ’69 was a time of a unipolar world, and the greatest power then was Czechoslovakia. The example of Finland – is a horrible example. I think that great powers actually could learn from not-big countries how to behave themselves. But they don’t get this example. Adam Michnik. As concerns «Solidarity», then this is indeed a long talk. But one thing I will say. The most dangerous moment for democrats-idealists – this is the moment after victory. Because freedom [is] for all, even for former Bolshviks. What did the Bolsheviks do? They started to destroy the people of the old regime. I’m from a communist family. And therefore I knew that we don’t need to take this road. Because this is the road to hell. Maybe, we might even lose the elections. But we’ll win democracy. And I remember how someone from Yeltsin’s team said to me: «We will not allow the communists to power». I was afraid to say something to this. I agreed with you during the time of the shooting of the parliament in the year 1993. But today we see the process of movement towards an authoritarian regime. I don’t have an answer, what to do. If I did have it, I would have received the Nobel prize a long time ago. Boris Dolgin. You think that what’s taking place now, – this is one of the results of the unreadiness to give away power in the 1990s? The desire to hold on to it by any means? Adam Michnik. I would not start to reply so firmly. But… Retort from the hall. This isn’t a road to authoritarianism. This is already within authoritarianism. Alexander Auzan. Tonight I crawled into the Internet to read what they’re writing about you in Wikipedia. Very much that is correct is written there, but there is also such a phrase: «This is a person who from an underground publication created a media-empire with a value of 400 mln. euros» How did you manage that? Adam Michnik. All of our bosses can tell you that. They simply hate us because of this. Because we’re independent. If this is interesting to you practically, come to Warsaw. You need to talk about this with our specialists on business. But one thing I knew. That Poles – this is a very complex nation. The editor-in-chief of the monthly «Kultura» Jerzy Giedroyc once said to me: «Don’t be afraid. Go against the majority. Go against stereotypes, against taboos. In the first minute you’ll get all the crap in the country. But then they, maybe, will see that you’re serious, and will start to respect you». And that’s what we did. We entered into conflict with all the great ideas and forces in Poland: with the government, with the church, with «Solidarity». Boris Dolgin. With the post-communists. Adam Michnik. Well, that’s by nature. We all were people from the underground. But we even defended them. We said that the philosophy of our transformation is in everybody having their place. Any person who wants to build a democratic state. And we made mistakes. Everything happened. But today we read every day about ourselves, that we’re oligarchs. And that one needs to struggle with us like with oligarchs. And during the time of Kaczyński we received a summons to go to court, because some criminal had said that we’d done something or other with the finances. I don’t have anything at all to do with the finances. I went there. Madame procurator wanted to talk with me. I told her: «Write the questions, and I’ll answer. We’re not going to have a talk, we’re not friends». And just imagine, this investigation ended on the next day after the elections. The elections were on Sunday. And on Monday they telephoned us from the procuracy ad said that there’s no crime. I love my country, but I love it without illusions. I understand perfectly well what can be. But of one thing I am convinced. You need to build the kind of institutions that will be independent even in dark times. Because anything is possible. Boris Dolgin. The crisis. What do you await for Poland, Russia and the world? Adam Michnik. I await that there won’t be a catastrophe. If it will be, then nobody knows what results it will bring. In the USA there were positive ones – Roosevelt, in Germany – Hitler. I’m afraid to answer this question, but in Poland there has already settled a fear, although not like the one in Moscow. Because nobody knows why all this happened. The stars of world economics are saying different things. Only everybody agrees that bankers are sly. As if though they were any different before. I would like to thank you again. It’s a great honor for me that I can say in Moscow what I think, and hear my friends. Thank you. 30 October 2008 ]]> Mon, 10 Nov 2008 13:08:56 +0000 michnik adam michnik russia famous polish dissidents dissidents world war poland world soviet newspapers newspapers Adam Michnik: The Fear of Russia's Wrong Direction <![CDATA[What is Russia Playing Around With Now?]]> http://iputin.net/article/e7603cd3d11f97bc8fb26a336be4cb2f http://iputin.net/article/e7603cd3d11f97bc8fb26a336be4cb2f
The RF government sanctioned yesterday the loan to Cuba. The money will go for buying Russia’s goods and services, RIA Novosti reported with reference to November 1 ruling. The maximum amount is $335 million.

Then maybe if Obama is smart he will ....

Obama, Medvedev Might Meet This Month
Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev may meet with U.S. President-elect Barack Obama already this month, RF Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said.

Then Russia...

Russia Sends Helicopters to Central Africa
The Russian Federation and the European Union inked in Brussels an agreement on Russia’s participation in the EU military mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/CAR), the RF Foreign Ministry announced.

Of course Russia has to stir up the European area....

Poland hits out at Medvedev's missile plans
The Russian president's remarks concerning the possible deployment of tactical missiles near Poland are an "unfriendly act," the Polish foreign minister said on Thursday.

Seems to always be a bus blown up somewhere. Why kill innocent people...

11 killed in public minibus explosion in North Ossetia's capital
Eleven people were killed in a public minibus explosion in the center of the capital of Russia's North Caucasus republic of North Ossetia, investigators said Thursday.

Ukraine keeps playing games with USA warships....

U.S. warship sails near Ukrainian port but skips planned visit
The USS Mount Whitney maneuvered for some three hours in the Black Sea near the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol on Thursday, but did not dock at the port as previously planned.

Bond, James Bond.....

Latest James Bond smash opens in Russia
The much-anticipated James Bond film Quantum of Solace, featuring Britain's Daniel Craig as the world's most famous spy, opened in movie theaters across Russia on Thursday.

Medvedev means what he says....

Medvedev: Change for America, change for Russia
In the meantime, Western media perceived the political part of Medvedev’s address as hostile criticism. Many newspapers wrote that Medvedev attempted to warn US President-elect Barack Obama against the deployment of the missile defense system in Europe. Foreign journalists were surprised with Medvedev’s suggestion to extend the presidential term in Russia from four to six years. It is worthy of note that Putin was strongly against making any constitutional changes at this point.

Yup, just another day in Moscow!

Kyle & Svet

comments always welcome.
]]> Thu, 06 Nov 2008 05:34:00 +0000 russia russia sends helicopters james bond bond obama president-elect barack obama james bond smash public minibus explosion port What is Russia Playing Around With Now? <![CDATA[Turkmenistan's Gas Bonanza]]> http://iputin.net/article/c3bb133cf2e05e637edab1c2bc3fd090 http://iputin.net/article/c3bb133cf2e05e637edab1c2bc3fd090 turkmenistan103008.jpg (AFP/Getty Images) The Financial Times is reporting that an independent audit of Turkmenistan's much lauded South Iolatan field has been completed, confirming it as one of the five largest deposits of natural gas in the world, boasting reserves more than twice the size of Russia's (in)famous Shtokman Field in the Barents Sea. Jonathan Stern of Oxford tells the FT that the field could take a long time to develop, and that "for now, the race for Turkmenistan’s gas is between Russia and China." Europe, as usual, is an unfortunate non-entity here. Russia probably doesn't like this news one bit, especially given that the prospects are looking stronger for Turkmenistan to get connected to China via pipeline, despite Gazprom's repeated offers to buy all of the country's gas at European market rates (similar offer was made to Libya and Azerbaijan). Ironically, leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) met in Astana, Kazakhstan to discuss the global economic crisis, calling for the end of monopolies. If Turkmenistan were to develop this massive field and export gas at competitive rates through the Nabucco to Europe, to China, and to Russia, then yes, we would at least be putting an end to one problematic monopoly: Gazprom. I suppose that Putin should have clarified that monopolies are OK so long as they are owned by the Russian government... ]]> Thu, 30 Oct 2008 12:59:25 +0000 gas field south iolatan field natural gas famous shtokman field turkmenistan export gas russia massive field Turkmenistan's Gas Bonanza <![CDATA[Grigory Pasko: Interview with Zakhar Prilepin]]> http://iputin.net/article/2d1ee2ae6354f005906ca6b51a32cffc http://iputin.net/article/2d1ee2ae6354f005906ca6b51a32cffc zakhar-2.jpgTalk of a writer with a lieutenant-colonel Grigory Pasko, journalist Если Вы хотите прочитать оригинал данной статьи на русском языке, нажмите сюда. In the writer Zakhar Prilepin’s essay "Поедем на авто, несогласный?" ["Shall we take a drive, dissident?"] (the book "Я пришел из России" ["I came from Russia"], Limbus Press, the year 2008) is described the dialogue of the author with an employee of the FSB (the feesbeshnik [FSB-nik—Trans.] speaks first):
“Look here, you’re a famous person – but you’re not afraid that they’ll use you?” “Who can use me, if I myself don’t want this? The CIA? The Pentagon? A masonic lodge?” “Well, something could be offered to you too…” “Nothing can be offered to me, I have everything. Things can only be taken away from me.” Further on, the author comes to the conclusion that he and his interlocutor are really not all that different. “The difference, really, is in one thing: if it will be necessary to ‘seat’ me [lock me up—Trans.] – he will ‘seat’ me. But I wouldn’t ‘seat’ him…”, - the author of the essay concludes his musings.
The essay was written in the year 2007. I recalled that about ten years ago the gebisty [’GB-ists, as in “KGB”—Trans.] had conducted such talks with me too. And had also asked the question: does it not seem to me that I am being used? And had also not said who specifically, in their opinion, was using me: the CIA, maybe, or a masonic lodge, maybe… And I, I recall, also answered something along the lines of how it was useless to use me. The fact is that it was the chekists themselves who wanted to use me. Just like their employers had used them. They never did understand that far from everybody is capable of being used, because they measure everybody against themselves: against their level of venality, intellect, disingenuity… The writer Zakhar Prilepin (real name – Yevgeny Lavlinsky) in his books told remarkably much about himself, and with astounding honesty. I seems that he did not conceal from the reader anything that he was ashamed to the point of impossibility of admitting. He described how he loved, and how he had waged war in Chechnya in the composition of a police detachment of special designation (OMON). As a writer, he became noticed, and that means – attractive for the FSB. Zakhar met with Surkov, Medvedev, Putin – he met as a writer, not as a member of a masonic-chekist lodge. And that’s why he has been on the FSB’s radar screen for a long time. And also he - is a member of the unlawful and unregistered party of the National-bolsheviks, the head of which – the writer Eduard Limonov – the FSB has been interested in for so long and so thoroughly that he’s already managed to “sit” [do time—Trans.] both in Lefortovo and in camp. The chekists are in general inclined to be interested not in secret enemies of the motherland, not in real traitors and spies, not in those who truly want to cause harm to the state, but in those who are in clear view. What for? I think because they’re afraid. They’re horrible cowards. They’re afraid that someone is going to become so popular among the people that he’ll be able to lead the masses after him with his word and that these masses will sweep away any leadership. They –the toadies of this leadership – don’t bother asking themselves the question about why the masses would want to sweep away the leadership. (And the masses want this perpetually). What is important for them is not to allow the appearance of such a person, who would be able to head the masses, to “kindle [their] hearts with a word”, to inculcate in them with his creativity, his utterances certain thoughts. Thus the KGB feared the bard Vladimir Vysotsky. Thus the FSB feared the journalists Yuri Shchekochikhin and Anna Politkovskaya… Thus the outcomer from the KGB comrade Putin feared – and fears! – Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Of course, they will never fail to tell authors that they read their books/interviews/articles – but only because “you’ve got to know your enemy”. And they let writers/journalists/political essayists understand that they’re watching them. May God be with them, those watchers: let them watch to their heart’s content. But unfortunately, as experience shows, they don’t stop at that. Then they climb with their muddy boots into the life of those who write. Then they “sew together” a criminal case for them. Then they “seat” them in jail and in camp… It’s hard to scare people like Limonov and Prilepin. But not all people who write are so brave. That’s exactly what they’re counting on. So there would be no noticeable people in the country. So that all would be gray – as gray as the toadies’ bosses from the KGB. So that the authors of brave thoughts would not (heaven forbid!) shake the foundations of the gray mass of the people with their seditions ideas and conclusions and would not force this people to do the most frightening thing from the point of view of the toadies – think. In the books of Prilepin there’s a lot that’s worth giving thought to… From the essay by Z. Prilepin "Господин президент, не выбрасывайте блокнот!" ["Mister president, don’t throw out the notebook!"]:
"I nevertheless hope that the person upon whom it has befallen to lead a country in not the easiest years will still manifest himself as a good and merciful ruler. Even in relation to those people who have strayed in something. There is still time to correct something. There, in the notebook, was the word 'amnesty,' and two more words: 'free elections.' Don’t throw out this notebook, citizen lieutenant-colonel."
A note from G.Pasko: Zakhar wrote this after a meeting of young writers with president Putin in the year 2007. Since that time, Putin hasn’t amnestied and hasn’t pardoned anyone. Today the practice of non-mercy is being continued by Putin’s placeman Medvedev. Apparently, Zahar made a mistake in the addressee: he asked the wrong person for mercy for those “sitting” in jails. And another thing: Zakhar, apparently, had forgotten that lieutenant-colonels, just like all military and semi-military in Russia, respond not to the word «citizen», but to the word «comrade»: this is more habitual for them since time immemorial, since back in those times when the country – like today – was run by a committee of state security. ]]> Mon, 27 Oct 2008 13:32:24 +0000 zakhar writer eduard limonov writer prilepin writer zakhar prilepin people putin scare people kgb comrade putin Grigory Pasko: Interview with Zakhar Prilepin <![CDATA[Was Joe Biden Talking About Russia in Seattle?]]> http://iputin.net/article/cb1b709a9178f7594cdcabbd4430a322 http://iputin.net/article/cb1b709a9178f7594cdcabbd4430a322 BidenJoemike.bmp
Democrat Vice Presidential nominee Joe Biden's remarks at a fundraiser in Seattle that an Obama Administration will be tested by an international crisis have drawn criticism from Republicans

Senator Joe Biden, Barack Obama's vice presidential nominee on the Democratic ticket for President, has never shied away from speaking his mind in public. At times this has led to ambiguous remarks, such as Biden's odd statement last year during the Democratic primaries that his future running mate Obama was "the first mainstream African-American who is articulate and bright and clean and a nice-looking guy". More recently, it has led the Delaware Senator who prides himself on being an intellectual to commit an embarassing gaffe, declaring that President Franklin Roosevelt appeared on television to reassure the American people after the stock market crash of 1929. In reality, FDR wasn't elected until 1932 and television only came online a decade later, in 1939.

On October 19, Biden appeared before 10,000 supporters at a campaign rally in Tacoma, then spoke at a reception for Democratic donors in Seattle in the evening. At this fundraising dinner, Biden warned Democrats and the American people that an Obama Administration would be tested by an international crisis within the first six months of 2009.

"Mark my words: It will not be six months before the world tests Barack Obama like they did John Kennedy. The world is looking. We're about to elect a brilliant 47-year-old senator president of the United States of America. Watch, we're going to have an international crisis, a generated crisis, to test the mettle of this guy."

Predictably, Obama and Biden's Republican opponent, Senator John McCain, pounced on the Biden remark to suggest that the Democrats were unprepared to face such a crisis and to highlight his own foreign policy experience.

"The next President won't have time to get used to the office," McCain said. "We face many challenges here at home, and many enemies abroad in this dangerous world. If Senator Obama is elected, Senator Biden said, we will have an international crisis to test America's new president. We don't want a president who invites testing from the world at a time when our economy is in crisis and Americans are already fighting in two wars."

Biden's Historic Analogy: Obama, Kennedy, and Russia

While this looks like typical partisan sparring during a fiercely contested presidential election year in America, the historic subtext of Biden's remarks seemed to have escaped much comment. That is, the comparison of Senator Barack Obama of Illinois to another young Senator who was relatively inexperienced upon assuming the presidency, John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

JFK was tested by Soviet Russia, under the regime of the former Ukrainian collective farming boss Nikita Krushchev. Following his notorious shoe banging performance at the United Nations shortly before the U.S. elections in 1960, the steely Soviet premier bullied President Kennedy at a summit in Vienna in 1961. After the botched CIA-backed Bay of Pigs invasion conducted by Cuban exiles in April 1961, Krushchev decided that Kennedy was a weak adversary who could easily be intimidated.

In a reckless move, Krushchev ordered Soviet nuclear missiles to be deployed to Cuba, 90 miles from the U.S. coast of Florida. If the missiles had been launched, they would have reached Washington D.C., only 900 miles away, in less than twenty minutes, leaving the President with no opportunity to evacuate the capital in the event of a nuclear war. The risk of World War III starting by accident or miscalculation reached a crescendo. President Kennedy responded with a naval blockade that searched all ships entering Cuban waters and prepared contigency plans for an all out-U.S. invasion of the island.

The crisis ended after thirteen days, when both sides realized they were on the brink of nuclear destruction and reached a face-saving compromise. In return for the Soviets publically withdrawing their missiles from Cuba, Kennedy secretly agreed to pull American missiles out of Turkey. The next year, President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, a seminal event that began a traumatic decade of political division and cultural upheaval for America. Under Krushchev's replacement Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Union dramatically expanded its military support for the North Vietnamese, costing America over 58,000 lives during the its decade-long war in Vietnam. The U.S., in turn, mirrored this Soviet proxy war by arming the Afghan mujahadeen who fought the Red Army in Afghanistan during the 1980s, hastening the collapse of the USSR.

The Cold War History Influencing the Present

Applying this history lesson back to the present, the 47 year old Obama's opponent in this presidential election, the 72 year old Senator John McCain, is a veteran of the Vietnam War, and spent nearly five years in the notorious Hanoi Hilton prisoner of war camp after being shot down in 1968. In spite of McCain working hard during the Nineties to reconcile the U.S. and Vietnam, Soviet Russian support for the North Vietnamese during the war may still influence the Senator's view of Russia today.

McCain is famous for mocking President Bush's 2001 statement that he looked into President Vladimir Putin's eyes and got a sense of the Russian leader's soul by declaring that he had done the same and saw three letters "K-G-B". The KGB line has become a regular part of McCain's foreign policy stump speech on the campaign trail. During the conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, McCain repeatedly condemned Russian actions and called for Ukraine and Georgia to be admitted into NATO as soon as possible.

Obama/Biden Toughened Their Rhetoric Against the Kremlin

In contrast, Obama was initially slower to condemn the Russian military intervention in the Caucases, and his first statement called on both sides to reach an immediate ceasefire. Only after McCain and other Republicans criticized Obama's response as weak did the Senator issue a new statement criticizing the Russian invasion of Georgia. However, Russian pundits watching the American elections could find little comfort in Obama's statements during the presidential debates, in which he declared that he and Senator McCain basically agreed on Russia and that the Kremlin had engaged in "evil actions" in Georgia. Obama also echoed McCain's call for Ukraine and Georgia to be brought into NATO.

What Was Biden Thinking? NATO, Ukraine and Georgia

After being questioned about his remarks at the Seattle fundraising dinner, Biden reportedly offered the Democrat donors in attendance several scenarios that could test an Obama Administration. While the main scenario Biden offered was predictably a confrontation with Pakistan over its support for Taliban insurgents in neighboring Afghanistan, Biden also mentioned a possible clash between the U.S. and Russia. Perhaps Biden had NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine in mind as the event that would precipitate a crisis.

The Kremlin has made it clear that Moscow considers bringing both former Soviet republics into NATO as a red line that the U.S. and Europe must not cross, and has now backed up this rhetoric with military force in Georgia. Nonetheless, for now, both candidates are promising a renewed push to bring these countries into NATO, even though "Old Europe" countries like Germany, Italy and France that depend on Russia for their oil and gas supplies support a go-slow approach to Ukrainian and Georgian membership. Given Russia's growing financial ties with the EU and the EU's dependence on Russia for energy supplies, this opposition is likely to harden in the months to come.

Gaff or Real Concern?

Given Biden’s propensity for public gaffs, his remarks leave us wondering. If past is prologue, what he said in Seattle may not mean anything. That said, the vice presidential candidate is one of the Senate’s foreign policy experts and might have real, if hidden, concerns.


Charles Ganske is the former editor in chief of Russia Blog and works in the financial services industry. The views expressed here are his own.

]]> Wed, 22 Oct 2008 21:46:38 +0000 obama senator obama senator barack obama barack obama mccain senator john mccain russia senator obama administration Was Joe Biden Talking About Russia in Seattle? <![CDATA[Mercury Rising: The "Piling On" of Karinna Moskalenko]]> http://iputin.net/article/04c1dc7feaa202f738bcff71ab10a0c1 http://iputin.net/article/04c1dc7feaa202f738bcff71ab10a0c1 a horrific mercury poisoning attempt in her car in Strasbourg, France. My subjective opinions on these events, colored as they may be by emotion, nevertheless lead me to believe that we are witnessing the latest chapter in a long established pattern of threats, harassment, intimidation, and now violence against lawyers in Russia. It is this pernicious pattern, and the institutionalized impunity that supports it, which must be unequivocally denounced, confronted, and challenged by every government, NGO, private sector company, and individual who still claims to uphold even the most minimal standard of ethics, morals and decency. moskalenko_karinna101508.jpg From the moment my friend Karinna arrived to the hospital, I was in frequent contact with her by phone. With the investigation ongoing, it would be improper for me to go into detail of the events, but good summaries can be found on the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and the Moscow Times. When I spoke with Karinna, she was not in mortal danger, but neither can I say that she was feeling even remotely well. But perhaps the most frightening aspect of this attempt was that it also indiscriminately targeted her daughter, who has fallen ill since the discovery of the poison. I need not describe to you what the physical effects are of extended exposure to mercury vapors, but let's just say that in his book Elements of Murder: A History of Poison, John Emsley devotes significant study to attempted murders using mercury, as well as the other more familiar heavy metals. There's no doubt that many are reminded of the murder by poisoning of the former spy turned whistle blower Alexander Litvinenko. Back then I published a piece on the Guardian's Comment Is Free which I believe was one of the first calling for the presumption of innocence of Russia's leadership before casting direct blame. I want to make it absolutely clear that in Karinna's case I also believe that we can't start pointing fingers, and that we need to proceed through the investigatory and law enforcement process before leaping to conclusions. It is a common and sober decency that was never afforded to us throughout the persecution of Khodorkovsky, and no one should be tempted to sink to the level of those prosecutors. But here is the rub as I see it: it really would make no logical sense whatsoever for either President Dmitry Medvedev nor Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to see another lawyer get attacked at this current juncture. In fact, one would assume that this is exactly the opposite kind of news they would want to see generate this month as they scurry to patch together their economy, cooperate like a model partner with the Sarkozy-orchestrated withdrawal plan from Georgia, and disaggregate Europe from the United States in the limited time they have left before the next U.S. president is sworn into office. That's the message I take away from Medvedev's now famous Evian speech - one part bluster and antagonism toward the United States, and two parts sweet talk to Europe. Russia knows what the EU wants to hear, and is good at rolling out these messages during times of need. It just wasn't a good time for one of these poisoning fiascoes abroad. So perhaps what we are seeing here is a familiar exercise in Russia's "authoritarianism without authority." Although by all appearances, Putin and the siloviki like to look like they are in total control of the country, in fact, the opposite is true. From lowly bureaucrats to higher corruption entrepreneurs and state corporate raiders, there is a pervasive sense of impunity throughout this government, and a crippling lack of accountability that accounts for the core problem of "legal nihilism" as identified by the president. There's little doubt that a wide range of government officials had become so used to Karinna Moskalenko as an acceptable target, especially after the highly public attempt to disbar her, that the reign of impunity for whatever action taken against her appeared to be complete. Back in the Soviet days, this was known as a practice of "piling on" whereby the government may not make any official state order to harass or intimidate an individual, it was understood through informal means who the targets were, and that nearly limitless resources could be dedicated toward sabotaging that individual's life. Everyone's mother, brother, sister, son, and lover would get in on the action with little fear of repercussions. This is the kind of process which made Stalin's terror possible, and although I am certainly not comparing today's Russia to the Soviet Union nor any current leader to Stalin, the impunity which makes a mercury poisoning possible is not something that we can simply overlook any longer. Furthermore, if we take the Litvinenko incident as an example, anyone caught up in an investigation can be sure to enjoy not only protection from the Kremlin, but also a lucrative career as a "national hero" in politics and business, as has been the case with Andrei Lugovoi. We shouldn't underestimate the importance of the "Lugovoi precedent" for all the eager young FSB agents looking to climb up the state corporate ladder. I am however happy to report that resolve remains strong. Karinna was one of the first people on the scene during my briefly dramatic midnight arrest by secret police in Moscow, and god only knows what might have happened to me without her dedicated help, the creative use of a cell phone camera, and the on-the-spot invention of a press conference. With the bravery that Karinna has shown not just in the Khodorkovsky case, but also in her defense of Anna Politkovskaya's family, Garry Kasparov, and victims of the Chechen war, I can tell you that these crass attempts at intimidation won't slow her down one bit. But we cannot allow this vacuum of accountability to persist any longer, and it would behoove us to consider asking the Russian government to make some official statements about their concern for the safety of both lawyers and journalists working in the country. ]]> Wed, 15 Oct 2008 20:28:06 +0000 karinna karinna moskalenko mercury friend karinna moscow times times russian government government president dmitry medvedev Mercury Rising: The "Piling On" of Karinna Moskalenko <![CDATA[A Death on Ice in Russia]]> http://iputin.net/article/c8dd18a7574197a0dfdc4d2eb1d30810 http://iputin.net/article/c8dd18a7574197a0dfdc4d2eb1d30810 alexei101408.jpgThe fervent brand of nationalism that has flourished in Vladimir Putin's Russia has taken on many forms, from Nashi youth rallies to nostalgic trends of consumerism to violence against immigrants. But perhaps the most vibrant arena for these patriotic exercises in national pride and supremacy (almost exclusively defined by comparison to the United States) is within sports nationalism. Many have already commented on Russia's bid, beginning last year, to build a competing elite ice hockey platform known as the Kontinental Hockey League (Континентальная Хоккейная Лига, or KHL), which would eventually overcome the popular National Hockey League in the United States, and lure away all the premiere talent with higher salaries. Look no further than how the state-run media has covered the rise of the KHL to see the enthusiasm of injecting nationalism into this sporting competition. All of this raises some interesting questions following the unexpected and tragic death of the 19-year-old hockey phenom (and leading prospect for the New York Rangers) Alexei Cherepanov, who suffered a fatal heart attack during a KHL game last night. First and foremost, one can't help but feel total and complete sympathy for the friends and family of Mr. Cherepanov. Our thoughts and prayers are with them. However, like any sporting accident, questions are already beginning to surface about whether something could have been done to save his life. Sportsnet.ca points to the investigations into deaths of previous hockey players, such as the Latvian Sergei Zholtok, who died while playing in his hometown of Riga:
Was the proper medical treatment employed in the critical moments after he collapsed on the way to the dressing room? Was medical staff aware of his heart arrhythmia, and how to properly deal with it at the moment of truth that night back in Latvia during the lockout of 04-05?
The New York Times Slap Shot blog writes:
The K.H.L. has convened its own special commission to “ascertain the circumstances” surrounding Cherepanov’s death under the leadership of Vice President of Hockey Operations Vladimir Shalaev (pictured here in a 2005 article on the transfer agreement with the N.H.L., and appearing in this interview with Vesti Sport on Tuesday, in which he discusses the lack of adequate medical equipment at the Vityaz rink). His committee has requested the necessary official documents on the incident and has asked for testimony from people linked to the game by noon tomorrow. In the transcript of the Vesti Sport interview, Shalaev says, “At the time when all this happened, the ambulance was not present and that is a flagrant violation.”
Meanwhile there are reports from regional investigators which suggest that Cherepanov suffered from chronic ischemia — a medical condition when not enough blood gets to the heart or other organs — and should not have been allowed to play in the game. Pavel Krasheninnikov, who sits on the Russian Hockey Federation's supervisory council and is a member of the State Duma, said "There are elements of negligence here." There are several general conditions which compounded the situation leading to Cherepanov's death. One is the country's notoriously antiquated health care and public safety infrastructure (such as rules for mandatory fire extinguishers and first aid kits), and the criminally slow response times for emergency medical service. As an illustration, I point to the description of the murder of journalist Paul Klebnikov in Steve LeVine's latest book. Most people think that Klebnikov was simply killed instantly in the street by his assassins. What actually happened was that despite being shot four times, he stayed alive for quite a while longer. It took one hour for the ambulance to arrive at the scene, and when it got there, it had no oxygen bottle. When the poor man finally arrived to the hospital, he got stuck on a broken down elevator beyond the reach of doctors, hours after the shooting, where he finally bled to death. Arguably the famous Forbes journalist had more than one murderer, if we consider this systemic failure. This also wouldn't be the first time in recent years that public safety preparedness has claimed lives. Despite Russia's resurgence, wealth, and glamor, the country remains quite a terrible place to suffer an accident. A 2007 report in the IHT comments:
Respect for law, safety and public health, and the Russian government's ability to govern, still lag far behind the Kremlin's restored sense of self, as evidenced by the scale at which Russia's population suffers from fires. More than 17,000 people died in fires in 2006 in Russia, nearly 13 for every 100,000 people. This is more than 10 times the rates typical of Western Europe and the United States, according to statistics from Russia's government, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the United States and the Geneva Association, a Swiss organization that analyzes international fire statistics.
True, the young hockey star playing for Avangard Omsk was not maliciously gunned down like a journalist, nor was there a fire in the building or a terrorist hostage situation. But questions are going to be asked about why there was no defibrillator on hand during such a high profile sporting event. The family will deserve to know why the ambulance took so long to arrive, and exactly what this "negligence" represented. Most modern sports arenas have an ambulance ready and waiting to go - in Omsk there was not one present. One sports analyst has already asked the most difficult question: Would Alexei Cherepanov be alive today if he had collapsed on the bench of the New York Rangers in the NHL instead of Avangaard Omsk in the KHL? The Slap Shot blog was rather blunt about the shortcomings in medical care: As it stands now, there are players in some North America beer leagues who might have gotten better emergency care than Alexei Cherapanov. I wish I could say we were confident that the official investigation into this tragic death will produce results. However, as we have learned from a diverse number of cases, the Russian judicial authorities seem more adept at manufacturing false political cases than solving real ones. I also wonder what the reaction would have happened if the situation were reversed - if somehow an elite American hockey player, a future prospect for one of the KHL teams, were cut down in his prime by a tragic accident on the ice, compounded by potentially negligent medical care. Some may recall that a few years ago, the Kremlin and its national press made a big political uproar about a few unfortunate and sketchy cases of Russian orphans receiving mistreatment (and in at least one case, a negligent death) in their adopted American families. Outraged by the immoral lack